International Diplomacy, Religion, and Reconciliation

An analysis of the Office of the High Representative and Religious Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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1. Introduction

After the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 90s multiple wars broke out in the Balkan area. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (further referred to as Bosnia) war broke out in 1992, the main belligerents during this war were the forces of, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Herzeg-Bosnia backed by Croatia, and Republika Srpska (RS) backed by Serbia. On December 14th 1995, the brutal war in Bosnia ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). It was arranged that Bosnia would be split up into two different entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the RS. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided even further into 10 different cantons. These entities were created along ethnic lines with the RS, representing a majority of Bosnian Serbs, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, representing majorities of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks.

Another provision of the DPA was the creation of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (HR) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HR and the OHR are responsible for the implementation of the DPA. Since Bosnia is still a very divided country, both politically and ethnically, it can be stated that the peace process has not been successful. A good example of this division is the separation of the educational system, the children follow different curricula depending on their ethnicity and/or religion, learning about their country and its history in very different ways.[1] Another example of this unresolved division is the fact that the former president of the RS and current Bosnian Serb member of the tripartite presidency of Bosnia, Milorad Dodik has threatened with a referendum on the independence of the RS.[2]

In a recent op-ed, the current HR Valentin Inzko stated that, although progress has been made in the first decade of the implementation of the DPA, in the recent decade progress has stagnated. This is exemplified by irresponsible politicians, some of whom call for secession and others even speak about war.[3] In academic literature the complex political system and the division of the country in the different entities is seen as a major problem for progression. It has also been stated that the dividing political system plays into the hand of politicians using ethno-nationalist rhetoric.[4] Have the Dayton accords with its dividing strategy and international oversight in the form of the OHR contributed to the peacebuilding process and reconciliation within the society or has it been upholding the status quo?

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[1] Hazim Fazlić, 'Perspectives on Building Trust among Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Challenges and the Role of Faith Communities', *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 50.2 (2015), 315–42.
[2] https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2017/0421/In-Balkans-a-fragile-order-grows-brittle-threatening-stability
[3] http://www.ohr.int/?p=98424
[4] Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western, 'The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart', *Foreign Affairs*, 88.5 (2009), 69–83 (p. 73).

Several commentators have also noted that, one of the main reasons that peace processes fail, is the fact that they overlook the underlying causes of the conflict and the relational aspects of the process. They are agreed upon at the highest political level and focus on the creation of democratic institutions, and repairing the economy.[5] While also necessary, it is also crucial to address the relational aspects, especially after internal wars, which pits neighbours and sometimes even family members against each other. A concept that is able to address these relational aspects of a peace process is reconciliation. In turn, the concept of reconciliation relies on concepts such as justice, forgiveness, repentance and truth. Through reconciliation it is possible to address the horrible past, while also creating space to envision a future based on mutual respect with common purposes. By incorporating the concept of reconciliation it becomes possible to move away from the resolving of conflicts by institutional and economic means alone and provide a more holistic approach, which is more able to transform conflict situations into sustainable societies.[6]

1.1 Ethnicity and Religion

In relation to the use of ethno-nationalist rhetoric by politicians it is important to note that evidence has been provided that nationalism and ethnicity are closely linked to religious affiliation in Bosnia. Bosnian Croats identify mainly as Catholics, the majority of Bosnian Serbs identify as Christian Orthodox while Bosniaks in general identify as Muslims.[7] This close relation is also evidenced by the terminology which is generally used in the media when describing the different groups in Bosnia, while Croats and Serbs are linked to a national or ethnic identity while Bosniaks are generally referred to as Muslims and thus only related to a religious identity.[8] This is a problematic use of terminology since it assumes either that everyone linked to this ethnicity is a Muslim or that those who are not a Muslim therefore belong to a different ethnicity, this however, is not the case. So in this research I will be using the term Bosniaks to refer to the population which are often referred to as the Muslims.

During the war these three religions and affiliated actors played a significant role, in some cases they provided justification for the violence committed to the other side. While in other cases religious leaders condemned the violence committed. But then again, mostly the violence committed

[5] Bojana Blagojevic, 'Peacebuilding in Ethnically Divided Societies', *Peace Review*, 19.4 (2007), 555–62 (p. 557); John Darby and Roger Mac Guinty, 'Introduction: What Peace? What Process?', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. by John Darby and Roger Mac Guinty (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 3; John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Society* (Washington, United States of America: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), pp. 24–25.

[6] Lederach, pp. 24–31; David Stevens, *The Land of Unlikeness: Explorations into Reconciliation* (Dublin, Ireland: The Columbia Press, 2004), pp. 22–23.

[7] Morgan Oddie, 'The Relationship of Religion and the Ethnic Nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina', *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, 32.1 (2012), Article 3 (pp. 34, 35).

[8] Christopher Hitchens, *God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (United States of America: Hachette Book Group, 2007), pp. 20–22.

against their own side.[9] Furthermore, it has also been argued that religious institutions have shaped the political and social lives of their members in Bosnia.[10] Additionally, it has been pointed out that the connection between religious leaders and the political elites is a challenge for the reconciliation and peacebuilding process in Bosnia.[11] Politicians use religion and religious leaders to strengthen their position and achieve their political goals while some religious leaders have accepted relations with politicians to gain as many privileges as possible.[12]

However, evidence has also been provided that religious actors can also be effective contributors to peacebuilding and reconciliation. While it has been well documented that actors can draw upon religious texts and traditions to incite violence and extremism, the opposite is also true, namely that is possible for people to draw upon sacred texts or traditions to foster reconciliation, and support empathy, forgiveness, truthfulness and social justice. Sterland and Beauclerck note that, the three Abrahamic religions especially 'contain clear instructions for peacebuilding'[13] So while the above makes clear that religious actors can be a hindrance in the peace process, it has also shows that they can be of great assistance.

1.2 International Relations and Religion

In relation to the DPA, OHR, and the different roles that religious actors can play in the currently stagnated peace process in Bosnia, it is important to note that arguments have been made that, in international diplomacy and in the academic field of international relations (and in secular political frameworks in general) religion is often overlooked.[14] Although religion has been incorporated more in the field of international relations (IR) since the events of 9/11, the focus has been mainly on explaining the roots and causes of 'religious' (fundamentalist) violence and not so much on the positive potential of religion.[15] And even though scholars have increasingly incorporated religion into the field of IR, Jonhston and Hoover wrote in the introduction to their 2012 compendium on the subject, *Religion and Foreign Affairs,* that this is the first time it has been possible to create such a collection and that, unfortunately the bad news is that 'the field should have reached this level of

[9] Fazlić, p. 324.
[10] Fazlić, p. 323.
[11] Noreen Herzfeld, 'Lessons from Srebrenica: The Danger of Religious Nationalism', *Journal of Religion & Society*, The Contexts of Religion and Violence, 110–16 (pp. 113, 114).
[12] Fazlić, pp. 335–37.
[13] Bill Sterland and John Beauclerk, *Faith Communities as Potential Agents for Peace Building in the Balkans. An Analysis of Faith-Based Interventions towards Conflict Transformation and Lasting Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Countries of Former Yugoslavia.*, 2008, p. 2.
[14] Erin K. Wilson, 'Being "Critical" of/about/on 'Religion'in International Relations', in *Routledge Handbook of Critical International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 1–2.
[15] Brian Cox and Daniel Philpott, 'Faith-Based Diplomacy', in *Religion and Foreign Affairs*, ed. by Dennis R. Hoover and Douglas M. Johnston (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2012), pp. 251–87 (p. 251).

maturation long ago.'[16] So although religion is included more often, and in more nuanced ways, this implies that there is still a lot of catching up to do in the field of IR regarding this subject.

1.3 Academic Relevance and Research Questions

When considering the situation in Bosnia, research has been done analysing the achievements of the DPA.[17] In these analyses, however, the religious dimension is missing and the policies of the OHR do not get much attention. And although research has also been published analysing the efforts and potential of religious actors to contribute to the peace process, a combination of the two is still absent.[18] Considering the fact that there are many positive examples of contributions by religious actors to reconciliation and peacebuilding processes around the world, an analysis of how the DPA and OHR try to incorporate religious actors in its policies could be a fruitful endeavour to show what are, and what are not productive ways to deal with religion and religious actors in international diplomacy. Additionally, it serves as a case study to show if the recent academic efforts to incorporate the different aspects and dimensions of religion in IR are also reflected in the policies of the OHR. Keeping in mind that religion has been retaking its place in IR since 9/11, we should be able to notice an increasing consideration for religion and religious actors in its policies. Taking all of the above into account the main aim of this research is to answers the following question: *What role have religious actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina played in the peace and reconciliation process, and to what extent has their potential (positive or negative) and influence been considered by the Dayton Peace Accords and the policies of the Office of the High Representative?* In order to answer this question, I will first take it upon myself to answer the following set of related sub-questions:

- What is the historical context of the conflict?
- Did the DPA (and if so in what ways) take into account religious actors and their potential to bring about reconciliation and peace?
- What have been the policies of the Office of the High Representative regarding reconciliation and peacebuilding among ethno-religious communities?

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[16] Dennis R. Hoover and Douglas M. Johnston, 'Religion and the Global Agenda: From the Margins to the Mainstream?', in *Religion and Foreign Affairs*, ed. by Douglas M. Johnston and Dennis R. Hoover (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2012), pp. 1–10 (p. 1).

[17] Charles-Philippe David, 'Alice in Wonderland Meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism and Peacebuilding in Bosnia', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 22.1 (2001), 1–30; McMahon and Western.

[18] Janine Natalya Clarck, 'Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Are Religious Actors Doing Enough?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62.4 (2010), 671–94; Önder Çetin, 'Fiath-Based Peace-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case of Islamic Leadership', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Religion and Conflict Resolution*, ed. by Lee Marden (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), pp. 297–318; Tania Wettach, 'Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, 28.4 (2008), Article 1; Marko Oršolić, 'Fostering Dialogue in a Multiethnic, Mulitireligious, Post-War Context in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, 35.2 (2015), Article 7; Fazlić.

- What efforts have been made by religious actors and what is their potential to bring about reconciliation and peace amongst the different ethno-religious communities?

1.4 Methodology and Structure

To tackle these research questions I will make use of document analysis. I will analyse the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the DPA are officially known. The agreement consists of 11 articles which are accompanied by 11 different annexes which all relate to different fields of a comprehensive peace agreement. Secondly, I have gathered and analysed decisions made by the different High Representatives which concern reconciliation. Additionally, I have analysed 53 periodical reports provided by the different HRs to the UN security council. The reports describe the implementation of the peace accords and are a requirement of the DPA, and UN security council resolution 1031. [19] During the analysis of this material, I have looked closely at whether, and how religion is considered.

Since there is a decent body of literature which describes the peacebuilding activities of religious actors, I will utilize this literature to give an overview of the contributions made to the peace process by religious actors. Furthermore, I will use this body of literature to describe the challenges related to religious peacebuilding in the Bosnian context. Also, survey results regarding the attitudes of the Bosnian people towards reconciliation and religious actors will be used to assess a realistic potential for religious actors to assist in the peace process.

Before turning to the analysis, I will first set out the theoretical framework of this research in the second chapter. In this chapter, attention will be given to the definitions of peace and violence, the general workings of peace accords, the concepts of reconciliation and track two diplomacy, and finally theories and concepts regarding (religious) peacebuilding and the dominance of the secular in the field or IR. This will be followed by a chapter in which the historical context and the role of religion in the conflict will be explored. When looking into potential reasons and causes why the peace process has failed it is crucial to first establish and understand the reasons and underlying causes of the conflict. Without this understanding any peace process is likely to fail. In the fourth chapter I will analyse how and if the DPA and the policies of the OHR incorporate religion and religious actors in the peace process. Subsequently, the fifth chapter takes inventory of all the efforts made by religious actors to bring about peace and reconciliation with or without cooperation of the DPA and OHR. In this chapter I will also consider what a reasonable potential is for religious actors to bring about peace and reconciliation in Bosnia, every peace process is different and has its own

[19] 'UN Resolution S/RES/1031 (1995)', *Office of the High Representative*, 1995 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=54277> [accessed 26 August 2018]; 'Annex 10', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63269> [accessed 27 August 2018].

unique challenges and will require different efforts (religious and secular) to be successful. Finally, the research will be concluded with the answering of the main research question and reflections upon the research itself as well as suggestions for further research.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Peace

The term peace can be interpreted in different ways and commonly it is understood in its narrow or negative definition. In this interpretation peace is understood as the absence of war or violence. This is what Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist who is widely regarded as the founder of peace and conflict studies, defines as a negative peace.[20] This definition of peace is more related to the process of conflict resolution rather than peacebuilding and reconciliation, the processes that will be investigated in this research.[21] Consequently, as one might expect this is not the definition that will be used during this research. When looking at the situation in Bosnia right after the signing of the DPA and also the current situation while utilizing the negative definition of peace, one can state that peace has been achieved since there is no more war and direct violence in Bosnia, and logically there is no further need for this research, since peace has been achieved.

However as Cady states, 'Peace is more than the absence of war.'[22] And it may not come as a surprise that Galtung also defined a positive peace in addition to the definition of a negative peace. Galtung defines positive peace as a situation of social justice where there is an absence of structural violence.[23] To help clarify this definition I will also introduce the comprehensive and influential definition of violence formulated by Galtung. As with peace, violence is also often understood in, what Galtung describes as, its narrow definition, the deprivation of health with killing as its extreme by an actor who intends for it to happen.[24] However, as Galtung also states, if we accept this as the definition of violence and peace is seen as the absence of violence 'too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace'[25]

Therefore, Galtung has offered a more comprehensive definition of violence: 'violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations'[26] Violence is that what causes the distance, increases the distance and that which prevents the decrease of the distance between the realization and the potential. This definition is then broken down but not limited to six dimensions, the most important of which will be discussed here. The most relevant dimension of this definition for this research is the

[20] Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6.3 (1969), 167–91 (p. 183).
[21] David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 3rd edn (United States of America: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2014), p. 8.
[22] Duane Cady, 'Pacifism, Religion and Conflict', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Religion and Conflict Resolution*, ed. by Lee Marden (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), pp. 191–202 (p. 197).
[23] Galtung, p. 183.
[24] Galtung, p. 168.
[25] Galtung, p. 168.
[26] Galtung, p. 168.

distinction between direct and structural violence. We speak of direct violence when an actor commits the violence. The narrow definition of violence is closely related to this form of violence.

Structural violence in turn, is violence in which there is no actor that commits the violence, the violence is built into structures and shows as unequal power and life chances. For example, when one group in society is denied access to medical care based on class or race. A further development of the concept of structural violence is cultural violence, which in a situation of positive peace also needs to be absent. In *Peace and Conflict Studies* Barash and Webel describe cultural violence as aspects of a culture at the levels of religion, ideology, art, language and (pseudo-)science that provide legitimizing frameworks for direct or structural violence. However, they also point out that structural and cultural violence are contested concepts, because at a certain level they are very open to interpretation. For example, do social inequality and or hierarchy always resemble structural violence? And do differing cultural norms and practices constitute violence?[27]

The concept of positive peace or social justice as stated by Galtung strongly resonates with the positive definition of peace as given by Cady, 'Viewed positively, peace is social order based on agreement arising from within groups through the cooperative participation of members.'[28] Using this positive definition of peace while viewing the current situation in Bosnia as described in the introduction, I argue that peace has not yet been achieved and therefore research into the reasons why the peace process has stagnated could prove very useful and is necessary to be able to develop and design better peace processes for the future.

2.2 Ethno-religious Nationalism?

Since religious, national, and ethnic identities are closely linked in Bosnia, while considering the fact that these different identities played a prominent role in the conflict, the Bosnian war may be identified as an ethno-nationalist, but also as an ethno-religious conflict. Religion and ethnicity, however, are both hard to define terms and it is important to analyse what role each element played in the conflict in order to organize a successful peacebuilding process. But, before analysing their respective roles in the conflict in the following chapter, I will first look at definitions of ethnicity and religion. Moreover, I will look at the how the dynamics and influence of ethnicity and religion in conflict are described in the academic literature and touch upon important theoretical discussions revolving around these concepts.

2.2.1 Ethnicity & Religion

Ethnicity has been defined in various ways by different authors, in this research I will opt to utilize the widely used definition formulated by Anthony Smith. Smith defines ethnicity as involving each of

[27] Barash and Webel, p. 8.
[28] Cady, p. 197.

the following six features: a collective name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, the association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.[29] Cordell and Wolf state that this definition of ethnicity is especially useful in the study of ethnic conflict because it draws on tangible (e.g. customs, traditions, language or religion) as well as intangible (e.g. sense of solidarity between group members, feeling of uniqueness) aspects of ethnicity and emphasizes both their objective as well as subjective elements.[30] Additionally, this definition is also useful because it is not essentialist in the sense that, considering the situation, different aspects may be viewed as the primarily differentiating aspect (religion, language, etc.) of ethnicity, not all ethnic conflicts follow the same patterns after all.

Just like ethnicity, religion is very hard and maybe even impossible to define in a satisfactory way. A multitude of scholars have given different definitions of the term. Generally, however, definitions focus on an existential or sacred notion, and the communities and practices that form around them. In this research I chose to utilize the definition given by Philpott (without claiming that it is a perfect definition), which was also chosen by the editors of the aforementioned compendium *Foreign Affairs* as the leading definition. Philpott defines religion as: 'a set of beliefs about the ultimate ground of existence, that which is unconditioned, not itself created or caused, and the communities and practices that form around these beliefs.'[31]

Looking back at the definition of ethnicity, it becomes more clear in which ways religion is related to ethnicity. Many of the defining features of ethnicity can be of a religious nature. For example, a common culture may very well be a common religious culture, the collective name of a certain group may very well be religiously inspired, and the shared historical memories of a group may include historical memories in which religion or religious figures play a prominent role. And as will be shown in the 3rd chapter the historical memory of a medieval battle at Kosovo involving a Serbian Christian prince plays a very prominent role in the formation of the religious, and ethnic identity of the Serbs.

2.2.2 Analysing Ethnic Conflict

Analysis of ethnic conflict has generally followed one of the following three perspectives, the

[29] Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, 'Ethnicity and Religion', in *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. by Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff (Abington, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2011), p. 68; Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2010), p. 15; Stuart J. Kaufman, 'Ethnicity as a Generator of Conflict', in *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. by Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff (Abington, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2011), pp. 91–92.
[30] Cordell and Wolff, p. 15.
[31] Daniel Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism', in *Religion and Foreign Affairs*, ed. by Dennis R. Hoover and Douglas M. Johnston (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2012), pp. 33–52 (p. 34).

primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist. It is interestingly to note that, Fox remarks that these same perspectives can, and sometimes are used to explain religious conflict, further demonstrating the close link between ethnicity and religion.[32]

The primordial perspective proposes that common cultures lead to strong identity groups. When these groups have overlapping interests it is almost inevitable that this will lead to violent conflict. Ethnicity is seen as something that is (almost) unchangeable and deeply rooted in historical experience, as such it should be treated as a given in human relations.[33] According to Kaufman this perspective on ethnicity implies that, 'ethnic conflict is based on "ancient hatreds" that are impossible to eradicate and nearly impossible to manage.'[34] Secondly, the instrumentalist perspective holds that, while ethnic identities are real, they only become politically relevant when political leaders exploit them for their own gains. The conflicts are usually not ethnic at all, but political leaders exploit these identities to further economic goals or to increase their power.[35]

Finally, constructivists argue that ethnicity is not natural or a historical given but that ethnicity is socially constructed, often to further political goals. This view calls extra attention to those, who Young calls 'cultural entrepreneurs', who create an ethnic identity by creating an ethnos-centred historical narrative, identifying internal heroes and external enemies, and building a literary tradition.[36] Kaufman links this process to the creation of a 'myth-symbol complex' a term introduced by aforementioned Smith. The myth-symbol complex establishes the accepted history of the ethnic group, defines the criteria for membership, identifies it's heroes and enemies and glorifies its symbols. Most of the times, these historical narratives mythicize the actual history, redefining specific (chosen) events as morally defining experiences of the group. In some cases these historical narratives might be entirely invented to create a new identity. According to Kaufman the constructivist perspective can be seen as a way to settle the argument between the instrumentalist and primordial schools of thought because it explains both the insights and problems of the other two viewpoints. He demonstrates this with an example relevant to this research:

> For example, most Serbs honestly believe that their identity is primordial, forged in the fires of battle against the Turks at Kosovo in 1389, so their perception is that their conflicts with Muslims are the result of primordial "ancient hatreds." In fact, though, that view of history was the result of late

[32] Jonathan Fox, *Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 through the Millennium* (United States of America: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 18.
[33] Kaufman, p. 92; Cordell and Wolff, p. 15; Crawford Young, 'Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. by John Darby and Roger Mac Guinty (New York, United States of America: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 13.
[34] Kaufman, p. 92.
[35] Kaufman, p. 92; Fox, p. 18; Young, p. 14.
[36] Young, p. 14.

> nineteenth-century Serbian politics and educational policy; before then, most Serbs did not think of themselves as Serbs at all.[37]

Politicians like Milosevic, however, did instrumentally use this identity to further their own political power and goals, but could only do so because it had been constructed earlier. This quote also provides further evidence of how the educational system in Bosnia mentioned in the introduction may further ethnic tensions, further stressing the importance of working towards a positive peace. Young also notes how the constructivist view explains the uneven level of mobilization potential between different ethnic groups. Those with a weak ideology of the collective self and without such rich historical mythologies, heroes, etc. possess less potential for mobilization than those groups with 'An extensively elaborated theorization of the group as speaker of a prestigious language, holders of a deep and historical legend, and possessors of a rich cultural tradition'.[38] As will be evidenced in chapter 3, the Bosniaks where the least prepared for the war, partly owing to a less developed collective identity. Regarding peacebuilding, the constructivist perspective shows us that it is also possible to create new more inclusive identities. After all, before the war a decent percentage of the population would identify as a Yugoslavian before anything else.[39]

Because of religion and ethnicity's close link and because of the different ways in which religious identity can interact with ethnic identity it will be hard to discern which role each element played in the conflict. Ruane and Todd, when writing about religion and ethnicity in the *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict* suggest investigating the relation between the two by asking four different questions:

- Are the effects of ethnicity and religion additive?
- Are they complementary?
- Do they coexist in tension, if so, which is stronger?
- Are there interactive effects with dynamic and emergent properties producing a much more complex field of relationships where the ethnic and the religious cannot easily be separated out?[40]

As will be shown in the following chapter, in the case of Bosnia the relationship between ethnicity and religion has been interactive, and ethnic and religious identities have almost become identical.

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[37] Kaufman, p. 93.
[38] Young, p. 15.
[39] Christopher Bennett, *Bosnia's Paralyzed Peace* (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 39–40 <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608293.001.0001>; Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal* (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 36, 69 <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730360.001.0001>.
[40] Ruane and Todd, p. 70.

2.3 Resolving Armed Conflict

Armed conflicts and wars are generally resolved by peace accords; however sadly, most peace accords fail. Of the hundreds of different kinds of agreements, ceasefires, etc. that have been concluded since the ending of the Second World War, relatively few have led to durable settlements.[41] These accords are generally reached after a negotiation process in which the hostile parties are assisted by a third party which plays the role of mediator or facilitator, this has also been the case in Bosnia.[42] One of the reasons peace accords fail as much as they do lies in the fact they fail to address the underlying or root causes of the conflict. Since the great majority of contemporary conflicts are internal, they often put neighbours and even family members at opposing sides of the hostilities. This characteristic of current conflicts creates even more animosity between the warring sides and reinforces the negative identities of the 'other' within a state. Peace accords, as I will demonstrate below, rarely effectively address these broken relationships and negative identities.

Additionally, peace agreements often provide some sort of power-sharing arrangement between the different parties. Because the international community has a strong bias against partition, power-sharing is commonly seen as the solution. However, power-sharing solutions should be used as a transitional device, since it often makes for too rigid systems that don't create enough space for the political and social changes necessary to address the root causes of a conflict.[43] And in Bosnia, as Wettach points out is no exception, here too does the power-sharing arrangement block reforms and plays into the hands of ethno-nationalist politicians.[44]

2.3.1 Peace Accords and international diplomacy

In addition to the above, Darby and Mac Ginty note in *Contemporary Peacemaking,* that for the international community the chief-aim is to reconnect a conflict-area to the global economy. This often results in a strengthening of the market economy while long-term durable development may get compromised. However, promise of economic development that does not get achieved may further exacerbate tensions and frustrations. While large-scale aid may be provided, this only reinforces the area as a consuming instead of a producing society.[45] Additionally, De Varannes states that, 'Economic development without autonomy and without strong legal and constitutional

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[41] Fernand de Varennes, 'Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Content and Approaches', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. by John Darby and Roger Mac Guinty (New York, United States of America: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 151.
[42] Christopher Mitchell, 'Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. by John Darby and Roger Mac Guinty (New York, United States of America: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 77.
[43] Timothy D. Sisk, 'Power-Sharing after Civil Wars: Matching Problems to Solutions', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. by John Darby and Roger Mac Guinty (New York, United States of America: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 140.
[44] Wettach, p. 1.
[45] Darby and Mac Guinty, p. 5.

guarantees of the rights of minorities has predictably been an ongoing contributing source of tension in many of the conflicts surveyed in this chapter.'[46] This statement by De Varannes is echoed by Wettach, who states that there are large deficits in the implementation of the civil aspects of the peace accords which arise from: 'the inefficiency and corruption of the political structures, insufficient development of the rule of law and the economy.'[47]

Peace agreements are usually concluded at the highest levels of representation. While in itself not necessarily a bad thing, this often leads to agreements among the political elite, but are not supported by the general population. Sometimes those who participate in peace talks are only invited because they represent military might and not because they represent the population. In consequence, other important voices without military power may go unheard while aggressive voices with said power are reinforced. This paradox is a consequence of the preferred, but in the case of internal wars, less suitable, statist approach in IR, the origins of this bias will be discussed further at the end of this chapter.[48] Furthermore, peace agreements may be insufficiently supported by peacebuilding activities. In this context, it is interesting to observe the analysis of Darby and Mac Ginty regarding the peace agreement in Bosnia:

> Some peace processes are largely creatures of the international community. They reflect the desired outcome of key states om the international community rather than the wishes of local communities. Bosnia-Hercegovina is a case in point. In many ways it is the product of planning in Western capitals rather than the result of local decisions. It is an artificial construct that leaves few of its inhabitants happy and risks storing up ethno-national tensions for the future.[49]

While peace agreements negotiated at the highest levels may speak of reconciliation and a shared future, many of the local communities may not be sufficiently prepared to take those steps. The disconnect between a peace processes designed by the international community and local interests can create serious problems. This is sometimes exemplified by the creation of an artificial civil society which is supported by the international community but has little grounding at the local level. The major connection is often funding instead of a shared vision for a pluralistic society.[50] As will be detailed in chapter 5, this is also the case in Bosnia.

This then raises the question: how does one create a peace process in which the root causes are properly addressed and in which the population can be committed to a shared vision for a peaceful society? The answer to this question brings us back to a vision of a positive peace. To

[46] de Varennes, p. 139.
[47] Wettach, p. 1.
[48] Lederach, p. 16; Darby and Mac Guinty, p. 3.
[49] Darby and Mac Guinty, p. 4.
[50] Darby and Mac Guinty, p. 4.

achieve conditions in which a positive peace can be established, the concept of reconciliation can be used and to which I will now turn my attention.

2.4 Reconciliation

In contemporary conflicts where neighbours and even family members are pitted against each other and cause each other harm, the hatred, fear and negative identities that are created and/or reinforced within a society will not simply disappear over time after a peace accord is signed. One of the ways to address these underlying causes and transform hateful images of the 'other' and heal the broken relationships, is through the application of the concept of reconciliation. Lederach, an expert in the field of peacebuilding, makes a compelling case in the book *Building Peace,* that peacebuilding as a practice, must shift away from the earlier mentioned statist approach, which is more focused on the resolution of a conflict to, a framework that is focused on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships. The central aspect of this peacebuilding framework must address and engage with the relational aspects of reconciliation.[51] This idea is repeated by Blagojevic who states that, while the popular approach to peacebuilding of liberal institutionalism, which focuses on formation of liberal economic and political institutions is valuable and necessary, it overlooks the concept of reconciliation which should be emphasized more in the peacebuilding process in ethnically divided societies.[52]

But what is reconciliation exactly? Reconciliation as described by Stevens and Lederach, means that people find a way to live peacefully together in difference, which does not seek to smooth out, or downgrade the differences within a society. It does however, seek to transform relationships so that difference can be dealt with in more constructive ways. To achieve this, reconciliation must deal with hurt, resentment, racism, etc. that exist in a (post-)conflict society. Furthermore, it must seek to transform relationships on a variety of levels, not only on the traditional levels of economics and politics but also on the spiritual, social, psychological, social levels.[53] As Lederach states:

> The immediacy of hatred and prejudice, of racism and xenophobia, as primary factors and motivators of the conflict means that its transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside the competency of international diplomacy. Reconciliation, seen as a process of encounter and as a social space, points us in that direction.[54]

[51] Lederach, p. 24.
[52] Blagojevic, p. 557.
[53] Stevens, pp. 22–23, 42–43.
[54] Lederach, p. 29.

This however still requires some clarification as to how these relationships can be transformed and what a framework of reconciliation entails. When explaining this framework, Lederach formulates three underlying working assumptions.

Firstly, conflict must be seen as a complex system, within that system reconciliation focuses its attention on (personal) relationships. Secondly, reconciliation represents a space of encounter where antagonists can hear one another's story, acknowledge each other, and start a dialogue of concerns of the past, but also of a shared future. The final assumption requires that we look outside the traditional discourse and mechanisms of international politics if we want to innovate the peacebuilding enterprise. This, among other things, includes a serious engagement with religions and religious actors, an engagement which has been neglected in the past in international diplomacy.[55]

2.4.1 Conditions for Reconciliation

Stevens notes that for reconciliation to take place, the following elements have to be present: justice, truth, forgiveness and repentance. Firstly, establishing the truth is very important because it is a condition for the other elements to be present. Without an agreement or acknowledgement of what happened and who participated, there is nothing to forgive, nothing to repent for, and no possibility to establish justice. Secondly, justice needs to be established to the greatest possible extent. Justice can be achieved in several different forms, punitive, structural, restitutional or restorative, and finally legally. Each conflict is unique and each will require its own consideration on what kinds of justice are appropriate to pursue and to what extent. However, it is important to keep in mind that achieving justice should be accompanied by the envisioning of a shared future. Thirdly, forgiveness includes that one lets go of the past and the possible pursuit, which in turn provides an opportunity to break the violence cycle and to establish a new more constructive relationship with a (former) antagonist. This, however, does not imply giving up on a justice claim. Finally, repentance involves the acknowledgement of one's wrongdoing, this will aid in establishing the truth, make way for forgiveness and involves making wrongs right, which in turn will help establish justice.[56]

While a complete fulfilment of all of these elements is unlikely in a post-conflict situation, working towards it on all the different levels can create room for empathy and a better understanding of one another, then reconciliation may be achieved over a longer period of time.[57] However great the potential of reconciliation to achieve social change in society may be, it also has its limits, and not all of the problems with peace accords and processes discussed above will be resolved with successful reconciliation. As Hamber states, 'The work of sustaining peace will be as

[55] Lederach, pp. 26–28.
[56] Stevens, pp. 28–31; Lederach, p. 31.
[57] Stevens, p. 31.

much about buying politicians into a more inclusivist form of governance, as it will be about ensuring that the issues which caused the conflict are addressed.'[58] However, it will be easier to achieve both if the issues are being addressed properly.

All of the abovementioned elements such as, justice, truth, etc. that are required for reconciliation and also the concept of reconciliation itself, are often common themes in different religions.[59] This is one of the reasons why religion and religious actors have been able to prove themselves as capable peacebuilders. Another reason why engaging with religious actors can be beneficial to a peace process is that many religious leaders are to be found in the second level of the leadership pyramid described by Lederach.

2.4.2 Level Two Diplomacy

An important element of the reconciliation framework is the leadership pyramid. The pyramid consists of three different levels. The first level, the top-level leadership, represents the highest but smallest group of leaders including, politicians, military, and religious leaders who are highly visible but less in touch with hardships a conflict produces on a local level. Because of their high visibility these leaders can often not afford to be very flexible regarding their positions. They often risk inciting huge backlash or being viewed as weak when swaying to much from their initial position.[60]

The bottom level, the grassroots leadership, consists of leaders who represent the masses. These include, but are not limited to, members of indigenous NGOs , health officials, refugee camp leaders, and in general people involved in local communities. They experience the hatred and fear that runs through a (post-)conflict society first-hand and have a better understanding of the local politics and the networks that run through the local community.[61]

Finally, the second level represents the middle-range leadership and can be identified in a few different ways. Firstly, as highly respected individuals who occupy formal positions of leadership in areas like, business or health. Secondly, middle-range leaders occupy important positions in primary networks within a society or conflict area, such as academic, religious or humanitarian networks. For example, a well-known and highly respected preacher within a region, or the head of an important indigenous NGO. Thirdly, one can look for middle-range leaders by focusing on identity groups in a setting and identify individuals who are well known and belong to a (minority) ethnic

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[58] Brandon Hamber, 'Transformation and Reconciliation', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. by John Darby and Roger Mac Guinty (New York, United States of America: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 230.

[59] María Pilar Aquino, 'Religious Peacebuilding', in *The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence*, ed. by Andrew R. Murphy, 1st edn (United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011), pp. 568–93 (pp. 578–79); Cady, p. 191; Cox and Philpott, p. 254; Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking* (New York, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 19.

[60] Lederach, pp. 38–41.

[61] Lederach, pp. 42–43.

group and/or are respected within a certain region but are also known outside of that region. Finally, one can look to highly respected individuals such as, a well-known literary writer or a Nobel prize winner who hails from the conflict area.[62]

While it is important to address and engage with all the levels of the leadership pyramid, it is the second level, the middle-range leadership, that holds the greatest potential to sustain a peace process and further reconciliation within a (post-)conflict setting. They have the greatest potential for a number of reasons. First of all, they are far more numerous than the leaders in the first level. Secondly, they are located between, and are well connected with, representatives of the top and the grassroots levels. Because they are less visible than the leaders in the first level, and are not, or significantly less, bound by political considerations, they can be more flexible than the leaders in level 1. They do however still have an influence on level 1, where the decisions are made. Because of their connection with the third level they are better informed of what the most prominent and important issues amongst the masses are. Furthermore, leaders from the second level tend to have pre-existing relationship with their counterparts across the divide in the society.[63] The connectedness of level 2 leaders is represented in figure 1, where the blue arrows show the different connections of the leaders, the red lines represent the divide in a conflict-society.



Figure 1: Leadership pyramid[64]

[62] Lederach, pp. 41–42.
[63] Lederach, p. 42.
[64] Lederach, p. 39. (blue arrows and red lines are my own addition.)

As demonstrated above the approaches by top-level leaders are often related to political settlements which rarely translate directly into behaviour at the lower levels. To achieve this, peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts at the third, and especially the second level are also required. It is at these levels that we find a lot of religious leaders who, as a result of their position within society, hold a lot of potential to sustain a durable peace process.

While the greatest potential for peacebuilding is found at the second and third level, top-level religious leaders could also provide valuable assistance in a peace process if they are willing to set a good example for their communities, which could mean that they have to defend a position which is deemed controversial in their community. And as stated above top-level leadership is often at risk of inciting huge backlash when swaying too much from their initial position. While in some contexts a radical change in position would certainly be beneficial despite the anticipated backlash, this is not a likely occurrence. This in combination with the fact that they are often less in touch with the hardships at the local level makes them less effective peacebuilders. Additionally, the abovementioned statist combined with the secular approach (to which I will turn my attention at the end of this chapter) generally does not allow for religious influence on agreements made at this level. Until these approaches change second and third level religious actors hold the greatest potential to aid in a peace process.

In Bosnia religious actors within the second and third levels also have a considerable potential to aid in the peace process as is evidenced by the following statement by Peuraca, 'To varying degrees, clerics of all religious traditions carry considerable weight within their communities.'[65] However, it must also be added that, while clerics carry a lot of potential to aid in successful peacebuilding activities, the opposite is also true. Their position can also be used to heighten tensions and incite hatred and fear between communities and eventually motivate and mobilize people to act out in a violent manner. This brings us to the field of religious peacebuilding.

2.5 Religious Peacebuilders, Who Are They?

As shown above, religious differences can be exploited to incite hatred and exacerbate divisions within a society. In fact, it will be almost impossible to identify a contemporary conflict in which religion plays no role.[66] There is however also a growing body of evidence that shows that religion and religious actors can also help to facilitate reconciliation and push the peace process further. While religiously motivated violence and terrorism have been widely reported and have gained political salience and influence disproportionate to the number of perpetrators and sympathizers,

[65] Branka Peuraca, *Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation* (United States Institute of Peace, 2003), p. 4.
[66] Cady, p. 191.

religious peacemakers as Appleby states: 'have proven themselves to be no les "zealous" then their violent counterparts. They are, however, less organized, less funded, less publicized, and less well understood.'[67] Fortunately the field of religious peacebuilding is growing and the field of IR is taking religion more seriously, this still means that it has been catching-up to its violent counterpart.[68]

But who are these "zealous" peacebuilders Appleby is talking about, and what are they doing to further reconciliation and a durable peace process? One of the few points most religions have in common is their commitment to the value of peace. So too can religious peacebuilders be found in most religious traditions.[69] The nonviolent resistance of Ghaffar Kahn was based on the Islamic principles of peacebuilding, compassion, patience and forgiveness. And while Ghandi has in recent years come under criticism for being discriminative, the nonviolent independence movement which he led was influenced by Hinduism. Furthermore, Christianity strongly influenced the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King jr. and was also a prominent element within South-Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[70] Phillpot and Cox divide the range of activities and initiatives of religious peacebuilders undertake into six main practices, these are:

- The impartation of a moral vision.
- Civil society at work.
- Personal relationships.
- Spiritual conversations.
- Prayer and fasting.
- Rituals for reconciliation.

A few examples of these initiatives and activities include :

- Constructing a truth commission.
- Relief and development work.
- Imparting a moral vision to a divided village.
- Building networks of relationships between political and religious leaders.
- Working for a peace settlement.

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[67] R. Scott Appleby, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Religious "Militants for Peace"', in *Religion and Foreign Affairs*, ed. by Dennis R. Hoover and Douglas M. Johnston (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2012), pp. 245–50 (p. 245).

[68] Appleby, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Religious "Militants for Peace"', pp. 245–47; Aquino, p. 570.

[69] Gopin, p. 13; Cady, p. 191.

[70] S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution', in *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, ed. by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, 1st edn (London, United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), pp. 264–84 (p. 274); '"Hier geen standbeeld van Gandhi"', *OneWorld*, 2018 <https://www.oneworld.nl/achtergrond/hier-geen-standbeeld-van-ghandi/> [accessed 12 May 2019].

- Facilitating interfaith dialogue.
- Seeking to build a movement for reconciliation within a civil society.[71]

These main practices and examples of peacebuilding activities hint at a peacebuilding framework which is more focused on relationships and reconciliation within society.

Before continuing on to the advantages and limits of religious peacebuilding I will shortly refer to Omer's critique and deepening of the practice of religious peacebuilding.[72] While Omer acknowledges the positive potential of religion and notes the above mentioned practices, she also provides a valuable critique and a call to expand the practice of religious peacebuilding to include 'the deconstructive analytical tools of discursive critique'[73] In the broadening of the practice of religious peacebuilding Omer calls for a more rigorous examination of how and why religion came to be entangled in (especially ethno-religious nationalist) conflict.[74] Omer observes that while religious peacebuilders take into account the fact that religion can also be a motivation for violence, they are at risk of essentializing religion in a positive way focusing only on how religion can contribute in a positive way to a post-conflict setting without paying too much attention to why and how religion has contributed to the specific conflict.[75] Additionally, Omer notes that if one wants to renegotiate exclusionary identities it is important to historicize, deconstruct and denaturalize those identities by 'revisiting the group's defining narratives, symbols, and memories, identifying how they came to represent the group and to show how they are not natural and axiomatic.'[76]

Therefore, religious peacebuilding also needs to take into account a critical examination of the context of each conflict since as Omer states: 'how one views the role of religion in relation to conflict affects one's understanding of the relevance of religion to peacebuilding.'[77] Furthermore, Omer calls for peacebuilders to be critical of the dominant secular frame in which they often operate and to be critical of how religion relates to structural violence.[78] She refers to this alternative mode

[71] Cox and Philpott, pp. 253–60; Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution', p. 277.
[72] Atalia Omer, 'Can a Critic Be a Caretaker Too? Religion, Conflict, and Conflict Transformation', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 79.2 (2011), 459–96; Atalia Omer, 'Religious Peacebuilding: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical', in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding*, ed. by R. Scott Appleby, Atalia Omer, and D Little (New York, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2015); Atalia Omer, 'The Hermeneutics of Citizenship as a Peacebuilding Process: A Multiperspectival Approach to Justice', *Political Theology*, 11.5 (2010), 650–73.
[73] Omer, 'Religious Peacebuilding: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical', p. 15.
[74] Omer, 'The Hermeneutics of Citizenship as a Peacebuilding Process: A Multiperspectival Approach to Justice', p. 652.
[75] Omer, 'Religious Peacebuilding: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical', pp. 8–10.
[76] Omer, 'Can a Critic Be a Caretaker Too? Religion, Conflict, and Conflict Transformation', pp. 3–4.
[77] Omer, 'The Hermeneutics of Citizenship as a Peacebuilding Process: A Multiperspectival Approach to Justice', p. 656.
[78] Omer, 'Religious Peacebuilding: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical', pp. 11–12.

of looking at religion in peacebuilding, hermeneutics of citizenship.[79] Acknowledging the importance of examining the reasons and manners in which religion has become a substantial element in the Bosnian war, this research will make a such a critical examination in chapter 3.

2.5.1 The Advantages of Religious Peacebuilding

Echoing the statements made by Lederach regarding the potential of level two diplomacy, Appleby writes that:

> It is clear that the religious communities who take on a peacemaking role often enjoy the considerable advantages of popular credibility. They exist as widespread organizations and networks at every level of society and have the ability to mobilize significant elements of the larger community, including international funding and moral support.[80]

This argument is repeated by Kadayifci-Orellana who also points to the advantages of religious actors as middle-range leaders and therefore have a great potential to engage with the top level leadership whilst also being able to engage with and convince the larger population of the benefits of a peace agreement and or reconciliation. She also points out that religious actor often enjoy credibility and are viewed as trustworthy by the communities. Additionally, Appleby points to the fact in several settings, religion maybe the only major institution on which the state cannot exercise its full control, functioning as an alternative moral authority.[81]

Furthermore, as stated before, virtually all of the contemporary conflicts have a religious component to them, however, this does not say that religion is at the root of all conflicts. This does mean, that religious actors, traditions and texts of all the major religions often get appropriated in the service of violence and war. Religious peacemakers, who base themselves on the same texts and traditions, have a better position to counter the violence legitimating religious actors. Precisely, because they can better understand what motivates the perpetrators of religious violence than secular peacemakers. Also, the religious peacebuilder can use these traditions, rituals and texts to help transform relationships, deal with strong emotions like anger and hatred, manage and heal deep injury and trauma, and provide legitimacy to reconciliation.[82]

International (secular) NGOs may exacerbate the conflict if they underestimate the value of particular customs, traditions, turf claims or rituals. It is because of this reason that it is important to

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[79] Omer, 'The Hermeneutics of Citizenship as a Peacebuilding Process: A Multiperspectival Approach to Justice', p. 652.
[80] Appleby, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Religious "Militants for Peace"', p. 247; Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution', pp. 277–78.
[81] Appleby, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Religious "Militants for Peace"', pp. 247–48; Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution', pp. 277–78.
[82] Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution', p. 274; Cady, p. 191; Gopin, pp. 13–19; Appleby, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Religious "Militants for Peace"', p. 249.

note that while religious peacebuilders will utilize the secular expertise and experience in conflict resolution, diplomacy, community development, etc. it is important to keep in mind that their main orientation will be based on their religious faith and that they are most effective precisely when they draw upon this faith. This is why religious differences should not be downplayed in the process. Instead there must be searched for ways in which the differences can exist next to one another in a peaceful (and constructive) way.

2.5.2 Limits of Religious Peacebuilding

Finally, it is important to note that, the effectiveness of religious peacebuilding should not be overstated also. While there is a great potential for religious peacebuilding, it is crucial that the economic, diplomatic, political areas are properly addressed and reconciled as well, what is argued here is, that there is a need for a more holistic approach in order to be able to achieve a lasting and durable peace. This approach should also address the, in IR often ignored, emotional fields of relationships and religious views. Additionally, religious peacebuilding should be a truly genuine effort which is not directed at conversion. Furthermore, one should handle religion carefully and be wary of the risks of incorporating religion in peace processes because of the fact that it can also contribute to intolerance and violence. And while the link between political elites and religious leaders can be beneficial, it can also prove to be an obstacle in a peace process. And, as will be shown in chapter 5, the link between political and religious leaders constitutes a major obstacle for the peace process in Bosnia.

All of the above shows why the field of IR should engage more with religious actors and educate themselves better in religious discourse in order to fully realize the potential of religious peacebuilding while also learning its limits.[83]

2.5.3 Interreligious dialogue

Before I move on to the final section, the abovementioned practice of interfaith or interreligious dialogue will be explained in more detail here since this practice has a significant place in the peace process in Bosnia. Furthermore, Kadayifci-Orellana identifies interreligious dialogue as an important peacebuilding tool, especially regarding ethno-religious identity conflict.[84]

First I will dedicate a few words on the concept of dialogue. Regarding dialogue, it is crucial to note the difference between a dialogue and a debate. In a dialogue (unlike in a debate) the goal is not to convince another of your arguments or agree upon one specific interpretation but rather to

[83] Cox and Philpott, p. 251; Appleby, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Religious "Militants for Peace"', pp. 248–49; Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution', p. 275.
[84] S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding', in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Inter-Religious Dialogue* (United Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2013), pp. 149–67 (p. 149).

clarify misunderstanding and to reveal areas of convergence and divergence.[85] Abu-Nimer et al. broadly define dialogue as: 'a safe process of interaction to verbally or non-verbally exchange ideas, thoughts, questions, information, and impressions from people with different backgrounds (race, class, gender, culture, religion, and so on)'[86] Through this process, trust can be rebuild, and a space for reconciliation can be provided.[87]

This means that in interreligious dialogue people with a different religious affiliation engage in a dialogue to gain understanding and acceptance of differences while also exploring similarities and common concerns. Through this process, mutual understanding and respect and be created while ignorance, fear, negative stereotypes, and misperceptions (elements that are among the causes of a conflict) about the 'other' can be broken down and clarified.

While formal interreligious dialogue involving official religious leaders is important, it is not the only form. Spontaneous and casual interactions between religious leaders, like sharing a meal or a handshake can be quite meaningful. But also joint art projects like, an exhibition, concert, play or dance can bring communities together and rehumanize the 'other'. As is clear, interreligious dialogue can take many forms and often includes religious symbolism and rituals.[88] By sharing rituals and symbolisms, participants can connect on a spiritual and emotional level, which in turn can generate support for the wider peace process and transform negative attitudes into more positive ones. Another important element of interreligious dialogue is the usage of religious language and vocabulary. This is important since the vocabulary of most religions contains important concepts such as, forgiveness, repentance, tolerance, peace, and justice.[89]

For interreligious dialogue to be successful it is important that differences are not downplayed since this can severely disrupt the process in a later stage when people are confronted which each other's differences. It is also important to keep in mind that syncretism, the merging of different religious perspectives, is not the goal of interreligious dialogue. While it may occur, that as a result of interreligious dialogue new rituals or practices are merged or co-created, this is in no circumstance the aim of the process.[90] Additionally, it is interestingly to note that Kadayifci-Orellana also identifies level 2 religious leaders as the best candidates for interreligious dialogue.[91]

While the above shows that interreligious dialogue can in a positive way contribute to a

[85] Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Amal Khoury, and Emily Welty, *Unity in Diversity: Interfaith Dialogue in the Middle East* (United States of America: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), p. 8.
[86] Abu-Nimer, Khoury, and Welty, p. 8.
[87] Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding', p. 152.
[88] Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding', pp. 153–55.
[89] Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding', pp. 152–54.
[90] Zoran Brajovic, 'The Potential of Inter-Religious Dialogue', in *Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten Years After Dayton.* (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2006), pp. 185–214 (pp. 187–88); Abu-Nimer, Khoury, and Welty, p. 13.
[91] Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding', p. 156.

peace process, there are also certainly limits to what interreligious dialogue can achieve. Furthermore, one must consider that not every context will lend itself well to interreligious dialogue and if applied in an unsuitable manner it may even become counterproductive. A few limits and challenges for interreligious dialogue include:

- *Convincing participants*: most of the time it is a difficult task to convince those who mistrust, or have been hurt by, the 'other' to participate in interreligious dialogue.
- *Time and financial resources*: interreligious dialogue is a time consuming and costly process, time and financial means may not always be sufficiently available.
- *Intra-faith differences*: even within a certain faith a variety of interpretations may be available. Representatives of a different perspective within a certain religion may not agree with the practice of interreligious dialogue and may act counterproductive, supporting exclusionist positions or even violent action.
- *Gender disparity*: in most religious traditions official leadership positions are held by men and therefore women are underrepresented in formal interreligious dialogue and peace-making. Nevertheless, many women are doing no less important work in the area of interreligious dialogue, however, often informally and on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, it is important to include more women in formal interreligious dialogue.[92]

2.6 The Dominance of the Secular

In this final section, I will look at the reasons why secularist and statist viewpoints and approaches have dominated the field of IR. Considering the body of evidence provided in the previous sections on the advantages of religious peacebuilding, the question rises, why has the field of IR has only recently begun to pay attention to religion once more. The answer to this question is twofold. First, I will turn to the impact of the secularization theory, a theory which originated around the 60s of the previous century and which has been a major influence in academia and policy, especially in the field of IR. This influence however has been declining since the end of the last century. Secondly, I will turn to what Philpott calls the 'Westphalian synthesis' for the second part of the answer.

The key idea of the secularization theory can be traced back to the enlightenment thinkers but also to scholars who were among the founders of the social sciences like, Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Freud.[93] The theory holds it that, the world will grow less religious because modernization will necessarily lead to a decline of religion, not only in society but also in the minds of

[92] Kadayifci-Orellana, 'Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding', pp. 162–63; Ina Merdjanova and Patrice Brodeur, *Religion as a Conversation Starter: Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans* (Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2009), p. 101.
[93] Fox, p. 12; R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 3.

individuals.[94] It assumes that religion will be pushed away by science and reason. Seeing how this theory was built on ideas already present with the founders of modern sciences it is not hard to see why it has been so influential in the academia. By now, in light of many examples of religious resurgence (Iranian revolution of 1979, various religious inspired terrorist attacks, the rise of political influence of Christian fundamentalists in America) the theory is mostly abandoned with earlier proponents of the theory, like Berger, now arguing against it.[95]

Secondly, Philpott also identifies the Westphalian state system, that was created with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and replaced a state system in which religion played an important role, as an additional reason why the field of IR has largely ignored religion. With the peace of Westphalia the sovereign state was created, and from this moment on rulers would refrain from enforcing religion outside their territory. Rulers would not only refrain from interfering in religious matters abroad, but internal religion would be given less attention also. This political authority structure is what Philpott calls the 'Westphalian synthesis' and is still robust to this day. Philpott identifies 4 essential features of this system:

- States are the legitimate polity in the international system.
- States refrain from seeking to alter the relationship between religion and politics in other states.
- Religious authorities exercise few If any temporal functions, still less on any transnational level.
- States seek far less vigorously to promote the welfare of religions.[96]

The influence of secularization theory and Philpott's concept of the Westphalian synthesis help us understand why policymakers and academics in the field of IR have a bias towards a statist approach and have neglected opportunities to successfully incorporate religions and religious actors into peace processes.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown the difference between a negative peace and a positive peace, and concluded that, in Bosnia, there currently is a negative peace which needs to be transformed into a positive peace so a cooperative society in which ethnic identity politics can't play their dividing role anymore can be established. With the analysis of the literature on peace accords and the explanation of the statist and secular approach in IR, I have also shown why the root causes of a conflict are often

[94] Peter L. Berger, 'The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview', in *Religion and Foreign Affairs*, ed. by Dennis R. Hoover and Douglas M. Johnston (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2012), pp. 21–32 (p. 22).
[95] Berger.
[96] Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism', p. 39.

not properly addressed which then often leads to a negative peace or a failed peace process.

Additionally, I have shown that through the concept of reconciliation and level two diplomacy, root causes can be properly addressed which then give way to a more sustainable peace process. Furthermore, I have provided evidence that religious leaders are well situated to facilitate reconciliation because of their, great numbers in middle-range leadership, status as credible and legitimate actors, and position between the top-level and grassroots,.

Finally, I have also demonstrated that religious and ethnic identity are closely linked and it is therefore important that, before I start my analysis of the peace process, I identify which role ethnicity and religion have respectively played in the conflict. This is of importance because then I will be better able to determine, a realistic potential for religious actors to contribute to a sustainable peace process, as well as, a realistic expectation of their fruitful incorporation in the peace process driven by the international community.

3. Historical context, ethnicity and religion

3.1 Broader Historical Context

Bosnia has very rich and turbulent history, although it has had roughly the same borders for more than 400 years, the political landscape has seen quite some transitions. In the middle ages the Christian kingdom of Bosnia was usurped by the Ottoman Empire in 1463, which introduced the Islamic religion in Bosnia.[97] After 400 years of Ottoman rule, Bosnia came under Austro-Hungarian rule in 1878 as the Ottoman Empire deteriorated.[98] After World War I, Bosnia became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ruled by a Serbian dynasty. During World War II however, Bosnia became occupied by the Independent State of Croatia, a puppet state of Germany and Italy governed by the fascist terrorist organization Ustaša. This regime was famously resisted by the Yugoslav Partisans under leadership of Josep Broz Tito, who unified Yugoslavia once again after the war under communist rule as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (further referred to as Yugoslavia). Bosnia would remain a federal state until the collapse of Yugoslavia at the end of the century.

All these political transitions have certainly made their impact on the religious and ethnic landscape. The people within Bosnia mostly adhere to one of three major religious traditions, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam. While there certainly has been conflict in the Bosnian history, in general these religious traditions seemed to have coexisted relatively peacefully in Bosnia. While some observers characterize this history as one of tolerance, others state that it was a mere passive or forced tolerance.[99] The fact remains however that under Tito there was a certain level of tolerance and unity. And while there may have been coercion, the view that the groups did not fight only as a result of forceful prevention by a (foreign) ruler does not explain all the complexities by which the conflict is characterized. It does not explain for example, why after Bosnia's declaration of independence, 30.000 Bosnian Serbs stayed in Sarajevo during the siege along with the Serbian born General Jovan Divjak who was loyal to the Bosnian government under leadership of Izetbegović. Or the fact that many Serbs opposed the war and fled abroad in thousands to avoid serving in the armies that were sent to Bosnia. Nor does it explains the intermarriages that were very common in the more urban areas of Bosnia.[100] These examples show why the often mentioned perspective of

[97] Cathie Carmicheal, *A Concise History of Bosnia* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 12–13.
[98] Carmicheal, p. 39.
[99] Paul Mojzes, *Balkan Genocides : Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011), p. 108; Robert J. Donia and John V.A Fine, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (United Kingom: C. Hurst & Co., 1994), pp. 6–9.
[100] Douglas M. Johnston and Jonathan Eastvold, 'History Unrequited: Religion as a Provocateur and Peacemaker in the Bosnian Conflict', in *Religion and Peacebuilding*, ed. by Harold G. Coward and Gordon S. Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 213–42 (p. 215); Mojzes, p. 22; Oddie, p. 35.

ancient hatreds is too simplistic and essentialistic. But if these ancients hatreds are not the (main) cause, then what are the reasons people picked up arms and committed such atrocities? It is to this question I will now turn.

3.2 Causes of the Conflict

The Bosnian conflict, as any conflict, is the result of a combination of many factors. And while the Bosnian war often gets characterized as an ethnic, nationalistic or religious war, there are also other important factors that helped to cause the war. Furthermore, different scholars point to the fact that an insecure social, economic and, political situation within a country creates a population which is more receptive of (religious) ethno-nationalism. The reason for this lies in the fact that other ethnicities/nationalities can be blamed for this insecure situation and be presented as to obstacles to positive social, political and economic development. Existing separately from the other groups is presented as a solution to the problems of one's own group. Therefore, it is also important to take note of the socio-economic and political context leading up to the war.[101]

First of all, Yugoslavia was dealing with a failing economy, even before Tito's death, Yugoslavia's economy had been deteriorating. Nearing bankruptcy, Yugoslavia was surviving on foreign loans. Next to the economic malaise, Yugoslavia was dealing with the deterioration of the political system, most of all, a consequence of Tito's death. In 1974 a new constitution was put in effect, which gave away power from the federal centre to the leaders and elites of the states and it gave the Serbian province of Kosovo autonomy. While designed to reinforce the structures of Yugoslavia to keep functioning after Tito's death, in practice it made Tito even indispensable than he already was. When Tito died in 1980 the communist authorities and elites of Yugoslavia had different visions on how to reform the federation, and furthermore, lacked the authority and popular mandate Tito enjoyed to improve the political system and economy.[102]

In this context it was Milošević, the president of Serbia's communist party, among others who set out to restructure the Yugoslav state and injected his party with a nationalism that was closely linked to the Serbian Orthodox Church.[103] Spurred by fear of a Serbian dominated Yugoslavia it was first Slovenia who replaced the single-party structure by multi-party elections in April 1990, followed by Croatia two weeks later and Bosnia by the end of the year. In Croatia the nationalistic Tuđman won the elections, partially on a commitment to stand up to Serbian nationalism and

[101] Christina Morus, 'The SANU Memorandum: Intellectual Authority and the Constitution of an Exclusive Serbian "People"', *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 4.2 (2007), 142–65 (p. 145); Alexander Mirescu, 'Religion and Ethnic Identity Formation in the Former Yugoslavia', *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, 23.1 (2003), Article 2 (p. 6); Blagojevic, p. 555.
[102] Bennett, pp. 33–34; Toal and Dahlman, pp. 22–23, 32–33.
[103] Bennett, pp. 35–36; David Bruce MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centered Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia* (Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 67.

promises which would threaten the rights of Serbs in Croatia.[104]

In light of the results of the Croatian elections, the Bosnian parliament adopted a law that banned political organizations based on ethno-national identity, this law was however deemed unconstitutional by the court and was removed. This resulted in elections in which more than 80 percent of voters voted for the 3 main ethno-national parties. Bosnian Serbs rallied behind the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) founded by Karadžić, Bosnian Croats voted for the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) the Bosnian offspring of the Croatian party founded by Tuđman, while most of the Bosniaks voted for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), founded by Izetbegović, which was neutral in name only and clearly represented the Bosniak agenda. Having agreed to a governing coalition, the three parties divided the key offices amongst themselves, with Izetbegović becoming president. However the parties proved incapable of co-operating, (also on a municipality level) which resulted in the failing of the Bosnian democratic institutions.[105]

After Milošević won the elections in 1990, he declared that Serbia would no longer adhere to the federal presidency. The problems Yugoslavia was facing in combination with the Serbian nationalist agenda and escalating violence in Croatia between Croats and Croatian Serbs following the Croatian elections drove Slovenia and Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia on the 25th of June 1991 which started the first Yugoslav wars. While the war in Slovenia was relatively short, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) unilaterally withdrew on 18th July, the war in Croatia would continue on.[106]

In Bosnia, many people were expecting that they would somehow avoid the war that was already raging in Croatia since the population made up of different nationalities and religions that had lived more or less harmoniously together. However, the chances that Bosnia could actually avoid the war were very slim, precisely because it was the most ethnically and religiously diverse state in Yugoslavia, consisting of 44% Bosniaks, 33% Serbs and 18% Croats (the Jewish and Roma minorities had mostly been cleansed in World War II). Besides that, it had to deal with expansionist countries on either side of its borders. Already in March 1990 had Milošević and Tuđman had met secretly to divide up Bosnia between Croatia and Yugoslavia, or at a minimum incorporate 'their' ethnic communities into their states. This left Bosnia with a false dilemma, either be a part of a Serb dominated Yugoslavia or to declare independence like Croatia and Slovenia which would likely lead to war.[107]

A national referendum on independence was organized on 29 February and March 1st which was boycotted by the SDS and the Bosnian Serbs. The result of the referendum was a 99.7% support

[104] Bennett, p. 41; MacDonald, p. 103.
[105] Bennett, pp. 40–44; Ivan Cvitkovic, 'Religions in War: The Example of Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, 21.6 (2001), Article 5 (p. 34).
[106] Bennett, pp. 47–53.
[107] Mojzes; Oddie, p. 35.

for independency based on a turnout of 64.4% roughly corresponding to the Croat and Bosniak proportions of the population. In the meantime Bosnia was fracturing along ethno-national lines while nationalist leaders like Karadžić incited their respective groups with extreme chauvinism. On 18 November 1991, in western Bosnia, The Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was proclaimed as a separate governing structure in Bosnia which was backed by Croatia. This was followed by proclamation of the Republika Srpska on the 9th of January 1992, an autonomous Bosnian Serb republic which would stay part of Yugoslavia. On November 12th Izetbegović had made an appeal to the United Nations for the immediate deployment of peacekeeping forces to avoid the impeding violence, this appeal fell on deaf ears however. The Bosnian government moved forward and declared independence on the 3rd of March 1992.[108] While hostilities in Bosnia had already started, the European community and the United States recognized Bosnia as an independent state on 6 and 7 April respectively. While more than 20.000 people were in Sarajevo protesting for peace and the unity of Bosnia, they were fired upon by Serb snipers killing two women. The same evening the siege of Sarajevo began as Serb artillery began bombarding the city. The war in Bosnia had formally started.[109]

3.3 The Rise of Nationalism

As Yugoslavia was disintegrating, the newly forming Yugoslavian identity was disintegrating with it. Nationalistic politicians took advantage of the situation, and as early as 1971 Serb nationalist themes were reintroduced into party elite debates. Also in Croatian circles nationalism already came to the forefront in the 1960s. However Tito, fearing nationalist politics cracked down on nationalist communists and purged them from the party in the early 1970s. The death of Tito in 1980 provided new opportunities for Serbian and Croatian nationalism to rise again.

In the 1980s and 1990s Serbian and Croatian history would be under heavy revision as MacDonald argues in his comprehensive account, *Balkan Holocausts?*. Especially World War II would face heavy alterations with Serbian writing, minimizing or revising Četnik atrocities while maximizing Serbia's role as a victim of Ustaša (or Croatian) persecution. Parallel to this were Croatian writers minimizing and revising the Ustaša atrocities and maximizing Četnik atrocities. This revisionism would eventually lead to paramilitary forces picking up symbols of these World War II groupings, showing that their not ashamed of their past, which further exacerbated the nationalistic anxiety.[110] One of the reasons why the history of the second World War II would be such a contested subject was the fact that after the war there had never been an open discussion among the different nations to establish a

[108] Bennett, pp. 64–65; Mojzes; David Campbell, 'MetaBosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998), 261–81 (p. 266); Carmicheal, p. 138.
[109] Carmicheal, p. 139; Bennett, p. 67; Mojzes, p. 110.
[110] MacDonald, p. 153; Mojzes, pp. 164–65.

historical narrative through which both Serbs and Croats could come to terms with their violent past. This also shows why it is so important to reconcile the population and to properly address a violent past. In Tito's Yugoslavia, the war was simply presented as an epic anti-fascist struggle of the partisans. An established historical narrative could have dispelled myths (some of which are still believed today) and could have prevented the easy manipulation of history by nationalists.[111] Not only World War II would face reinterpretation, but distant histories were also subjected to revisionism.

3.3.1 Serbian Nationalism

In Serbia's case, the fierce nationalism came initially as a response to demonstrations in Kosovo. In 1980, Albanians (a 90% percent majority in the province) protested for more autonomy and even a republic status for Kosovo. Kosovo plays a crucial element in the ethnoreligious identity of the Serbs, it is home to some of the most admired religious sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). Furthermore, it was the place where the Serbian Orthodox Prince Lazar fought a losing battle against the Ottomans in 1389. This battle would become highly mythicized in revisionist histories of Serbia in the 1980s and Lazar would gain status as a martyr for the Serbian cause.[112] However, after these events Serbian nationalism would continue on, for a great extent, in anticipation of, or reaction to Croatian nationalism.[113] Not only politicians would introduce these nationalistic themes as is evidenced by the memorandum drafted by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) in 1986.

The SANU memorandum, which was signed by 216 Serbian intellectuals, directly challenged the Yugoslavian creed of "brotherhood and unity" and contains a revisionist, mythicized, and teleological interpretation of Serbian history. A case is made for the historical victimhood of the Serbian people, drawing comparisons to the fate of the Jews in Europe. This victimhood started at the loss at the Battle of Kosovo and would continue onward to the World War II Ustaša atrocities against the Serbs and the social and economic victimization under Tito. Current events were explained by reference to these distant histories. By only offering a view of the Serbs as martyrs and victims the complexities of histories are obscured and old stereotypes get reinforced. The memorandum became an influential document for, politicians like Karadžić and Plavšić and eventually, the constitution of a Serb nationalist identity.[114]

Next to this memorandum, politicians and intellectuals would continue to write about these nationalistic themes. As a result of this historical revisionism, claims were made for territories,

[111] Bennett, pp. 29–30; Morus, p. 153.
[112] MacDonald, pp. 64–65.
[113] MacDonald, p. 91.
[114] Morus, pp. 145–46, 152; Mirescu, p. 3; Toal and Dahlman, pp. 41–44.

stating that they once had been a part of a greater Serbia. Furthermore, the envisioned historical victimhood of Serbs led Milošević to argue that he had the responsibility to protect all Serbs even those outside the border of Serbia. Additionally, by the end of 1987 Milošević had gained control of 90% of the information that was provided to the population of Serbia, effectively creating a propaganda machine for the Serbian nationalist programme.[115]

3.3.2 Croatian Nationalism

After the communist crackdown on nationalism, Croatian nationalism would continue in the anti-communist diaspora, which was often well-financed and co-ordinated. These people dreamed of returning to an independent Croatia free from communism. The diaspora communities would also provide crucial financial and personal support for Tuđman's rise to power in 1990. Tuđman, once a prominent communist, had gained popularity by writing nationalistic accounts of Croatia's history and therefore going against the communist project, an act for which he was imprisoned two times, once in 1971 and in the early 1980s once more.[116] When he was in power he grabbed control of the media just as Milošević had done in Serbia, turning it in a propaganda machine for Croatian nationalism.[117] Croatian nationalism also contained a revision of history. In these revised histories a claim was made for Croatian victimhood throughout history, specifically focusing on the time period that Croatia had been part of the first Yugoslavia. Furthermore, it positioned Croatia as part of the European West, claiming it has always been Europe's last defence against the supposed backwardness of the East Islam and Christian Orthodoxy. Serbs, in turn, posited that they as Christian Orthodox had been Europe's last defence against the backwardness of the East and Islam.[118]

Additionally, both sides would claim through these revised histories and myths of victimisation that Bosnia had historically either been Serbian or Croatian and that the Muslim population of Bosnia were really fallen Serbs or Croats who had been forced to abandon their true identity following the Ottoman invasion.[119] These arguments would legitimize their respective wars in Bosnia, both claiming territory which they were historically entitled to, while in the process liberating Muslims who were in fact misled Croats/Serbs. This argument would be further stretched between Croats and Serbs, both claiming that with the great schism of 1054 the Croats, respectively Serbs, lost their true identity.[120] These historical arguments also explain the practice of forced conversions during wartime, since a conversion to Orthodoxy/Catholicism would bring misguided members back to the right path. These examples already show the mixing of ethnicity and religion as enemies are

[115] Toal and Dahlman, p. 43.
[116] MacDonald, pp. 99–100.
[117] Toal and Dahlman, p. 44.
[118] Oddie, p. 38. MacDonald, pp. 98, 116–19.
[119] MacDonald, pp. 220–23.
[120] MacDonald, pp. 83–84, 116–17.

marked as those with a different religion. Additionally, these arguments also legitimizes claims to a Greater Serbia/Croatia.

3.3.3 Bosniak Nationalism

Bosnian nationalism is more ambiguous, while Mojzes states that its nature is unclear and up for debate, MacDonald states that it de-emphasised ethnicity, focusing more on shared cultural practices, common experiences and religious faith. This focus on collective identity was however seen as weaker by the Croatian and Serbian sides. The Muslim nation was considered illegitimate, a fabrication of the Ottomans and Tito, lacking the primordial history that the Croat and Serbian nation had. Furthermore Serbian and Croat propaganda claimed that the Bosniak/Muslim ideology sought to impose an Islamic rule over Bosnia.[121]

Interestingly to add, is that MacDonald points to the role of the internet, which was just becoming available in this period of time, which greatly improved the distribution of all the nationalistic writings by the Croatian and Serbian intellects.[122] While both these revisionist histories argue for the ancient-hatreds interpretation of history and ethnicity, the efforts of these nationalist intellectuals and politicians clearly represent the concepts of cultural entrepreneurs and the myth-symbol complex described in chapter 2. Before continuing it is important to add that these nationalistic politicians and intellects were not completely without criticism in their own countries.[123]

3.4 Religion and Ethno-nationalism

In the previous sections it already becomes clear that, politicians and intellectuals are incorporating religious elements in their nationalistic themes. However, while certain politicians and intellectuals may have been eager to create and utilize this ethnoreligious nationalist identity, this process is of course not a one way street, and religious actors are not just mere passive victims. So in these last sections I will analyse how religious actors acted and reacted upon the creation, and incitement, of ethno-nationalism and the roles they played during the war.

Before continuing it is important to point out that in Bosnia, religion has a very unique position. While in most European countries language has had a decisive role in national differentiation, in Bosnia religion presents the clearest cultural marker. When taken into account that Bosnia is linguistically one of the most unified regions in the Balkans, and additionally, racial and class differences were not stable foundations for the creation of an ethnic identity, religion, with its long history and mythical heroes like the Christian prince Lazar and the battle at Kosovo, became a

[121] MacDonald, pp. 221–22; Mojzes, p. 165; Cvitkovic, p. 36; Oddie, p. 36.
[122] MacDonald, p. 114.
[123] Toal and Dahlman, p. 45.

differentiating characteristic and a mobilizing element.[124] Furthermore, different commentators point to the heritage of the *millet* system which was in place in the Balkans during Ottoman rule. It was an elaborate system designed to manage cultural and religious difference. While the central state functions (foreign policy, security, etc.) were performed by the Ottoman administration, each cultural/religious community was given significant autonomy to govern its internal affairs. The control of each so-called *millet* would be given to that communities religious leaders. So religious communities became the main vehicles for the preservation, and transmission of culture and national identity. The system forged a strong link between culture, politics, religion, and ethnicity during the centuries of Ottoman rule.[125]

Additionally, it is interestingly to note that religious belief in Yugoslavia had been declining since World War II, in the 1953 census less than half the population expressed religious beliefs. Further research in the 1960s and 70s also showed a decline of religious activities. While this process is also a result of the suppression of religion by the Tito regime it also provides further evidence that the strong ethnoreligious identities in Yugoslavia were created and not a primordial given.[126] Religion had not been an important element in people's lives for years and all of a sudden it became of vital importance because of its strong links with nationality and ethnicity.

In general there is a consensus in the academic literature that religious actors collaborated with political nationalists, especially in the case of the Catholic Church and the SOC. After Tito's death, the political disintegration, unstable socio-economic conditions provided a vacuum in which religious elites could re-establish there importance in society .[127] However, it was also done out of genuine concern for their communities.[128]

3.4.1 The Serbian Orthodox Church

Just as Serbian historians and other intellectuals, the SOC had also contributed to the escalation of militant nationalism. The church's role, as MacDonald states, was even more important, 'By acting as the conscience of Serbia, they provided a greatly needed spiritual underpinning for Milošević's movement'.[129] When the earlier described political upheaval in Kosovo started church officials enhanced the precarious situation by making allegations of genocide against Serbs. And when Milošević came into power the SOC quickly offered its support, motivated to advance the religious rights that had been suppressed under Tito.[130]

[124] Mirescu, pp. 2–3; Carmicheal, p. 16; Cvitkovic, p. 32; Oddie, pp. 34–35.
[125] Johnston and Eastvold, p. 225; Brajovic, p. 193.
[126] Mirescu, p. 5; Johnston and Eastvold, p. 220.
[127] Mirescu, p. 6; Cvitkovic, p. 42; Oddie, p. 41; MacDonald, p. 67.
[128] Johnston and Eastvold, p. 230.
[129] MacDonald, p. 67.
[130] Mirescu, pp. 7–10; Johnston and Eastvold, p. 227.

Most notably, in 1989 the SOC sponsored a programme and rally to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Battle at Kosovo. Before the rally, the relics of prince Lazar were paraded around Serbia under the eye of the media. While at the rally, in the attendance of a huge crowd (1-2 million people had gathered for the celebrations) Milošević gave a fiery nationalistic speech while surrounded by orthodox priests and bishops who were holding aloft icons of Milošević and Lazar.[131] Next to that the SOC organized an enormous posthumous funereal in August of 1991 for 3000 victims of World War II which had been exhumed in the previous months. The funeral was televised live and featured the patriarch of the SOC singing the liturgy, and leading nationalistic politicians and intellectuals were giving speeches. It was these types of actions that blurred the lines between politics and religion while also merging the Serb identity with the Orthodox one.[132]

As the war with Croatia had started and Milošević's communist regime became more authoritarian, leaders within the SOC realized that the partnership with Milošević may cause more harm than good. This led to SOC participation and organization of anti-government demonstrations throughout the 1990s. However, some leaders within the SOC refused to renounce their support to leading nationalists, especially to Bosnian Serbs who were more pro-Orthodox, Karadžić for example, enjoyed considerable support from the SOC.[133] During the war there were mixed signals coming from the Orthodox Church. While the SOC made public statements decrying the violence and calling for increased policing, the Church was simultaneously denying large-scale violence and organized rapes, claiming their own victimization at the hands of genocidal Croats and promoted the expulsion of Muslims. Furthermore, there were members of the Church who openly supported acts of aggression against the other and even blessed soldiers before and after they had committed atrocities.[134]

3.4.2 The Catholic Church

Just like the SOC, the Catholic Church was seeking to re-establish their importance in society and also contributed to the creation, and escalation of ethno-religious nationalism. They did so, firstly by their interpretation and unwillingness to offer any form of atonement or regret for the atrocities committed against the Jews, Serbs, and Roma, in which a number of clergy were directly culpable. This infuriated non-Croats and seriously hampered reconciliation between the Catholic Church and the SOC. Secondly, they joined the Croatian nationalistic revision of World War II, minimizing Croat atrocities while maximizing their role as victim. Additionally, there was the staunch defending of Archbishop Stepinac who was widely criticized and suspected of supporting the Ustaša regime. While only suspected of support, he certainly failed to take a stance against the persecutions that were

[131] MacDonald, p. 71; Mirescu, p. 10.
[132] Mirescu, p. 11; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 15.
[133] Mirescu, p. 11; Johnston and Eastvold, pp. 227–28; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 16.
[134] Oddie, p. 40; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 15; MacDonald, p. 241.

happening and approved the forced conversions of Orthodox adherents, actively undertaken by his episcopate.[135]

Furthermore, the Church openly supported Tuđman's right-wing party and its secessionist agenda, before, and after, the 1990 elections. The Church's leadership was well represented at the opening sessions of the Croatian Parliament and were letting no opportunities go to waste to use photo opportunities to be seen together in the media, and as Mirescu states 'much was done to reinforce the unity of church, nation, and state.'[136] Only as Tuđman's nationalistic policies became more hostile (like the reintroduction of symbolism harking back to the Ustaša regime), and his regime more authoritarian, did the Church decide to take more distance. Macdonald however also states that, 'While the Cardinal of Zagreb and the Archbishop of Sarajevo bravely condemned the escalation of violence, local branches of the Church were often supporters, particularly in Hercegovina.'[137]

3.4.3 Islam

Unlike the Serbian and Croatian case, Bosniak nationalism, as stated above, focused more on a collective identity and took on a more religious (Islamic) character in response to the Serbian and Croatian ethnoreligious nationalism. Moreover, the Bosniak nation had an underdeveloped national consciousness and underdeveloped national symbols. This led to the strengthening of their Muslim identity.[138]

While there were atrocities committed on all sides of the conflict, if one of the three sides was victimized during the war, it had been the Bosniaks. So as the war proceeded, and help or intervention from the West remained absent, Muslims, who previously had led a relatively secular life, sought refuge amongst their fellow Muslims and adopted a more orthodox adherence to their faith.[139] As the war proceeded some Muslims began to embrace the idea of an Islamic nation-state and there was a declining tolerance seen among some religious leaders. Some Muslims clerics for example, tried to pass laws prohibiting mixed marriages or the consumption of pork.[140]

Additionally, because of the religious character of the war, mujahedeen who were done with the war in Afghanistan were flooding into Bosnia to take up arms and defend the Muslims against the Christians. These mujahedeen strengthened the Islamic ideology among many Bosniaks. Furthermore, Iran also send aid in the form of arms and advisors.[141] Although in a different situation

[135] Oddie, p. 39; Mirescu, pp. 12–14.
[136] Mirescu, p. 14.
[137] MacDonald, p. 241.
[138] Cvitkovic, p. 34; Johnston and Eastvold, p. 228; Mojzes.
[139] Johnston and Eastvold, pp. 228–29; Oddie, pp. 38–39.
[140] Oddie, p. 39; Johnston and Eastvold, p. 229; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 16.
[141] Johnston and Eastvold, pp. 228–29; Mojzes; Oddie, pp. 38–39; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 16.

and perhaps less deliberate, actors from the Islamic faith also contributed to the war and the strengthening of exclusive ethno-religious identities.

3.5 Conclusion

As this chapter shows the causes of the war are multiple, and the ancient hatred/primordial perspective does not do justice to its complexities. Furthermore, it also shows that ethnoreligious national identities were actively created by a wide range of actors, from intellectuals to politicians and religious actors. So while this chapter shows that the war was not inherently ethnic or religious, it also does not vindicate the religious actors. The active nationalization of religion and the sacralisation of the nation fuelled the creation of exclusionary identities. Moreover, it provided a spiritual justification for soldiers fighting the war, who in addition to fighting for their sacred country were also fighting for, and defending, their religion.

The implication of religious actors in aiding the escalation of ethnoreligious nationalism obviously provides obstacles for their role in peacebuilding activities. However, if religious actors are willing to critically judge their own behaviour, distance themselves from nationalism and engage in constructive discussions with actors from different faiths they can also have an important role in the peacebuilding and reconciliation process. Just as they aided in the creation of exclusionary identities they may also contribute to the creation of more tolerant collective identities. Finally, those individuals and communities that were already condemning and protesting against violence from all sides during the war are of course actors with a greater potential to aid in the peace process.

4. Analysis of the DPA and the policies of the OHR

4.1 The Dayton Peace Accords.

The Dayton Peace Accords were signed on 14 September 1995 in Paris and formally ended the war. The agreement consists of 11 articles, which are all accompanied by 11 different annexes which relate to different fields of a comprehensive agreement. The accords have been signed by the presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. The SOC mediated in the early stages of the negotiation that Serbia would sign and negotiate on behalf of the Republika Srpska, evidencing the important role religious actors can play in diplomacy.[142] The fact that the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia are the only signatories is also notable, considering the fact that the Bosnian war is often interpreted as a civil war.[143]

Most of the articles of the agreement make reference to the different annexes in which the agreement is elaborated. Before the analysis I will first provide the list with the 11 annexes:

1-A: Agreement on Military aspects of the Peace Settlement.
1-B Agreement on Regional Stabilization
2: Agreement on Inter-entity Boundary Line and Related Issues
3: Agreement on Elections
4: Constitution
5: Agreement on Arbitration
6: Agreement on Human Rights
7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons
8: Agreement on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments
9: Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations
10: Agreement on Civil Implementation
11: Agreement on International Police Task Force[144]

As stated in chapter 2, one of the main reasons peace accords fail is the fact that they do not address the underlying causes of a conflict, reflecting a disconnect between the negotiators and the population on the ground who are not quite ready to move along with the envisioned peace process. Through their position in society, explained in chapter 2, religious leaders can be of great influence on the grassroots level. Furthermore, they can address the underlying causes, remaining tensions

[142] MacDonald; Johnston and Eastvold, p. 230; Bennett, p. 77.
[143] Campbell, p. 267.
[144] 'The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1252> [accessed 27 August 2018].

and foster reconciliation by motivating people to acknowledge, confess, apologize, and forgive crimes by drawing on religious resources.[145]

Looking at the list, it is clear that annex 7 and 10 specifically should address the underlying causes of the war and convince the population of the envisioned peace process. Since annex 7 focuses on the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes it should also incorporate a focus on relational aspects. Since the reasons people have become refugees or displaced may very well be the actions of neighbours and local residents, the process of return could prove very difficult and unsuccessful if no attention is paid to the relation of the refugees with the local residents. Religious peacebuilding can be of assistance in mending those relationships.Additionally, annex 10 focuses on the civil implementation of the peace accords. While this entails aspects like the creation of political and economic institutions, it also encompasses the continuation of humanitarian aid as long as necessary.[146] As stated before, a successful peace process incorporates peacebuilding activities which also focus on the healing of relationships. Therefore, some of the aid provided should address this area. It is in this area that religious NGOs that can draw upon religious concepts of repentance, forgiveness, etc., could provide valuable assistance.

While annex 4, 6, and 8 also take some consideration of religion, for example the right to freedom of religion, the right not to be discriminated against on religious grounds and the reconstruction and designation of structures as monuments on the basis of among other things religious grounds it is not quite the type of engagement with religion this research is focused on.[147] The rest of the annexes deal with fields which are also important for the peace process but don't offer any realistic opportunities for religious peacebuilding. So, it is thus in annex 7 and 10 were we might encounter meaningful engagement with religion and, possibly a vision for reconciliation which seems necessary for the successful return of refugees and displaced persons. So I will now continue with a more detailed analysis of these two annexes.

4.1.1 Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons

The first article of Annex 7 makes clear that all refugees and displaced persons since 1991 have the right to have their property restored, or to be compensated for property that cannot be restored. Moreover, it stresses the importance of this objective within the peace agreement. To achieve this

[145] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 2.
[146] 'Annex 10', p. 10.
[147] 'Annex 4', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63255> [accessed 27 August 2018]; 'Annex 6', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63259> [accessed 27 August 2018]; 'Annex 8', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63265> [accessed 27 August 2018].

objective the parties have agreed to a couple of confidence building measures to create suitable conditions for refugees and displaced persons to return, these include:

- the repeal of discriminatory legislation or administrative practices
- the prevention and suppression of written or verbal incitement of ethnic or religious hostility and/or hatred
- the dissemination of warnings through the media against acts of retribution
- the protection of ethnic minority populations and the provision of immediate access to these populations by international humanitarian organizations
- the prosecution of persons in (para)military and police forces and other public servants who have violated basic rights of persons belonging to ethnic or minority groups[148]

Moreover, it has been agreed that the UNHCR will be the leading organization and will coordinate among all agencies assisting with the return and relief of refugees and displaced persons. While all these measures are helpful and needed in creating suitable conditions they are mainly focused on preventing the (violent) expressions, there is no focus on actively improving relations if people choose to return. The fear and hatred between people who have been involved in a brutal conflict will not simply disappear with these measures, the hateful images and negative identities of the other need to be seriously addressed in order to create truly sustainable situation for the return of refugees. As shown in chapter 2 these issues could be addressed by applying the concept of reconciliation and by employing religious peacebuilding. It may however be that the UNHCR or other agencies it coordinates developed plans which addresses these issues but this is not mentioned in the peace accords, which is the focus of this research.

4.1.2 Annex 10: Agreement on Civil Implementation

As is made clear from its title, annex 10 focusses on the civilian implementation of the agreement, a crucial process in which, as stated before, religious peacebuilding can be of assistance. The way in which annex 10 provides a vision for the implementation of the peace process is in the form of the creation of the HR. First, I will provide a description of the tasks and responsibilities of the HR as described by the peace agreement. This will show what the vision for the implementation of the peace agreement is and will also give an indication of the level of engagement with religious actors the peace accords provide.

[148] 'Annex 7', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63261> [accessed 27 August 2018].

Broadly, the responsibilities and authorities of the HR as described in the peace accords are as follows. The HR:

- will monitor the implementation of the peace settlement and maintain close contact with the parties that signed the agreements to promote their full compliance with all civilian aspects of the peace settlement.
- will coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia to ensure the implementation of the settlement is as efficient as possible.
- will facilitate resolutions of difficulties arising in relation to the civilian implementation of the peace agreement.
- will participate in meetings of donor organizations especially regarding rehabilitation and reconstruction and provide guidance to the international police task force established in annex 11 of the accords.
- will convene and chair the Joint Civilian Commission in Bosnia. The commission will be compromised of senior political representatives of the signatories of the accords, the commander or representative of the Implementation Force (IFOR), and representatives of those civilian organizations or agencies the HR deems necessary.
- has the authority to establish subordinate Joint Civilian Commissions at local levels and may also establish other civilian commissions within or outside of Bosnia to facilitate the execution of his or her mandate.
- 'is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.'[149]

As is clear, these responsibilities do not directly entail an engagement with religious actors, they do however, provide opportunities to do so. Religious organizations or actors may be part of the Joint Civilian Commission or the HR may establish a commission consisting of different religious actors. So while engagement with religious actors it is not directly incorporated into the peace accords, it provides opportunity to do so. It all depends on how the HR will shape his or her policies. What is interesting to add before moving on, is the fact that there are no conditions or deadlines stated for the abolishment of the institute. This brings us to the second half of this chapter in which the policies and decisions of the HR will be analysed on the basis of their engagement with religious actors.

4.2 The OHR and The Peace Implementation Council

Regarding the decisions of the OHR it is necessary to provide some additional context. This is because of the fact that the HR received additional powers from the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) a

[149] 'Annex 10'.

few years after its establishment. After the negotiations of the DPA were concluded, a Peace Implementation Conference was organised in London from 8 to 9 December 1995. The aim of the conference was to mobilise international support for the peace agreement and it resulted in the establishment of the PIC. The PIC consists of 55 countries and agencies which support the peace process in different ways. The conference also established a steering board for the PIC to 'work under the chairmanship of the High Representative as the executive arm of the PIC'[150] The steering board provides the HR with political guidance on peace implementation.[151] This also shows the influence of the international community on the OHR and the peace process in Bosnia.

After a PIC meeting in Bonn in 1997 the PIC issued the *PIC Bonn Conclusions*, a document to which the OHR continually refers to when making binding decisions. In this document the PIC states that:

> it welcomes the High Representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary[152]

He may do so on a number of issues but also on 'other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities'[153] This vague wording allows for a very broad interpretation of authority of the OHR, and in the *Goettingen Journal of International Law*, Banning contributed an article questioning the legality of these powers.[154] These powers however have been used time and time again, and so its resulting decisions will also be subject to analysis.

4.3 Decisions of the OHR

Since the volume of decisions is simply too great for the scope of this research and the main focus of this research is reconciliation and how religious peacebuilding can aid reconciliation I will only analyse the decisions made by the OHR which are categorized under the following heading 'Decisions in the Field of Property Laws, Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees and Reconciliation'.[155]

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[150] 'Peace Implementation Council', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1220> [accessed 26 September 2018].
[151] 'PIC London Conclusions', *Office of the High Representative*, 1996 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=54165> [accessed 26 September 2018]; 'Peace Implementation Council'.
[152] 'PIC Bonn Conclusions', *Office of the High Representative*, 1997 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=54137> [accessed 26 September 2018].
[153] 'PIC Bonn Conclusions'.
[154] Tim Banning, 'The 'Bonn Powers'of the High Representative in Bosnia Herzegovina: Tracing a Legal Figment', *Goetingen Journal of International Law*, 6.2 (2014), 259–302.
[155] 'Decisions of the High Representative', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1196> [accessed 23 August 2018].

Of the more than 100 decisions made by the OHR in this field, only a small number deal directly with the relational aspects of reconciliation. The bulk of the decisions are related to property rights of refugees and displaced person or amendments of the law regarding the disposal of state property.[156] Furthermore, there are decisions relating to personal documents and to, the banning of the use of offensive insignia by police forces.[157]

The decisions that can be classified as dealing with reconciliation are those that deal with the memorial and cemetery in Srebrenica. In total there are 3 decisions related to this. Firstly, there is the decision which designates a piece of land for the purpose of a cemetery and memorial centre. Secondly, a decision which establishes the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery.[158] Thirdly, the decision which transfers the ownership of the battery factory in vicinity of the memorial centre to the foundation. The factory was the place where the families were separated during the genocide. While these last mentioned decisions are good examples of reconciliation efforts they are still not examples related to religious peacebuilding.

So regarding the decisions made by the OHR in the field of reconciliation there is no consideration for religion. While its mandate can be interpreted very broad it must also be said that the decisions are mostly taken reactive to facilitate resolution regarding specific legal issues. So it is less surprising that these decisions do not really engage with religion. Within this research I am more focused on finding a proactive engagement with religious actors to bring about reconciliation something which might feature more in the reports of the OHR to the UN. Since reconciliation is an important aspect of achieving a positive peace it is important to engage with religious actors since as stated by Phillpott:

> Reconciliation finds a particularly strong justification in religious texts, traditions, and theologies and is espoused by religious actors disproportionately to secular actors. Religious people are arguably largely responsible for making reconciliation a fixture in today's global political discourse.[159]

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[156] 'Decisions in the Field of Property Laws, Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees and Reconciliation', *Office of the High Representative* <http://www.ohr.int/?cat=366> [accessed 26 September 2018].
[157] 'Decision on the Use of Inoffensive Insignia and Symbols by the Police and Judicial Institutions in the Federation', *Office of the High Representative*, 1999 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=67673> [accessed 26 August 2018]; 'Decision on the Validity of Public Documents Issued by the Competent Body of SFRY', *Office of the High Representative*, 1999 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=67677> [accessed 26 August 2018].
[158] 'Decision on the Location of a Cemetery and a Monument for the Victims of Srebrenica', *Office of the High Representative*, 2000 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=67588> [accessed 26 August 2018]; 'Decision Establishing and Registering the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery', *Office of the High Representative*, 2001 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=67761> [accessed 26 August 2018].
[159] Daniel Philpott, *Religion, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: The State of the Field*, Social Science Research Council Working Papers, 2007, pp. 3–4 <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Philpott-2007_final.pdf>.

4.4 OHR Reports

To analyse the policies of the OHR, I will now turn to the 53 reports described above. The reports details the events during the reported period but will also provide the range of activities the active HR was involved in. For this part of the analysis I have indexed all of the reports, this index can be found in the attachment. The reports generally cover a period of 4 to 8 months and broadly describe the situation, the progress made, and the difficulties that arise in the implementation of the peace agreement in the different areas of society. For example, almost all reports contain a section of the political situation in the two different entities the Federation and the RS, the economy, media, military, the return of refugees and on judicial reform and human rights issues.

For the index I have categorized the reports in 3 different ways. The first category designates if the reports contains an example of engagement with religion with the purpose of peacebuilding. The second category designates if the reports only mention religion in general. Finally, the third category contains the reports that did not make any mention of religion at all. The reports are chronologically ordered so considering the statement made in the introduction of this research, that religion in general (and more recently) religious peacebuilding, is gaining importance in international relations (especially since 9/11) we should be able to detect an increase in the mentioning and engagement with religion. Additionally, the index also shows which HR was active during the reported period so that shifts in policies may also be attributed to personal influence of the respective HR.

A first review of the index shows that of the 53 reports, 24 reports do not make any mention of religion or religious actors at all. Next to that, 27 reports only feature a general mention of religion, the mentioning of religion in this category can be as broad as the observation that pilgrims uneventfully crossed the inter-entity border to celebrate the Papal mass, to the statements describing various occasions in which religious property was destroyed or reconstructed.[160] In the majority of these cases the mentioning of religion has been in connection to negative events, e.g. the resurfacing of tensions between religious communities, the destruction of religious property and more recently, the radicalisation of Muslims who tried to travel to Syria to join Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Furthermore only 6 of the 53 reports feature examples of religious peacebuilding.

Since there are only 6 instances in which religion is mentioned in relation to peacebuilding

[160] '17th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 2000 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=57335> [accessed 26 August 2018]; '5th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 1997 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=57299> [accessed 26 August 2018]; '7th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 1997 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=57291> [accessed 26 August 2018].

activities I shall describe these here. The first instance is in a report from 1999 and notes the organisation of round table discussions regarding education (which as shown in the introduction is still an issue) to which representatives of different religious bodies were invited. The 17th report notes that the HR has discussed restitution programmes with local authorities, the country's religious leader, international organizations and embassies. Thirdly, a 2001 report mentions that the school subject 'Culture of Religions' will be introduced at schools in September of 2002. In the 20th report, which covers the period from 6/2001 to 8/2001, the HR states that his office continues to attach high importance to the role of religion in the reconciliation process among the ethnic communities. Additionally, he states that his office is looking to revitalize the Inter-Religious Council which gathers the leaders of the main religious faiths from within Bosnia. While an excellent example of facilitating religious peacebuilding it is odd that the HR states that his office continues to attach high importance to role of religion while this is the first such mention in any of the reports.

In the 21st report, the HR notes that the Reconciliation and Reform Committee in the RS, which was formed under pressure from the HR after Serb nationalist violence occurred at different reconstruction sites of mosques, has only met once. While not explicitly related to religion it is explicitly related to reconciliation and was formed after violence directed at religious sites, however as the comment of the HR shows, the commission is not a very successful endeavour. Further on in this report, the HR states that his office continues to facilitate dialogue between the three majority religious groups, focussing especially on the reconstruction of religious monuments as a means of encouraging religious freedom. While a good example of religious peacebuilding there is no focus on reconciliation and the transformation of relationships an area in which religious peacebuilders can be of even greater assistance. Lastly the 23rd report mentions that on the 7th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre a ground-breaking ceremony took place, a private occasion which involved the members of the families and religious officials. Once again a good example of the way in which religion can aid in the reconciliation process.[161]

As stated before when looking chronologically at the reports we should see an increase in

[161] '15th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 1999 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=57259> [accessed 26 August 2018]; '19th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 2001 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=68607> [accessed 26 August 2018]; '20th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 2001 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=53817> [accessed 26 August 2018]; '21st Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 2002 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=52557> [accessed 26 August 2018]; '23rd Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 2002 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=49968> [accessed 26 August 2018].

engagement with religion. However, as we can see above the last time religion was mentioned in relation to peacebuilding and reconciliation was in the 23rd report which covers the period of 5/2002 to 10/2002. Interestingly to add is the fact that the first five reports which featured religious peacebuilding activities were provided by HR Wolfgang Petritsch. This of course suggest that Mr. Petritsch has had more sensibility for the potential of religious actors in the peacebuilding and reconciliation process. Finally, I also have to add that many reports also noted the involvement of NGOs in different areas of the peace process, this may or may not include religious organization as well. But considering it has been explicitly mentioned in reports in the time that religious peacebuilding was lesser-known in IR and diplomacy we could expect explicit mentioning in later reports when religion is gaining importance and the potential and successes of religious peacebuilding are more widespread under academics and diplomats.

Concluding the analysis of policies I would like to add that in 2008 the steering board of the PIC introduced 7 requirements for the closure of the OHR also known as the 5 +2 agenda. The requirements are the following:

- Acceptable and sustainable resolution of the issue of apportionment of property between state and other levels of government.
- Acceptable and sustainable resolution of defence property
- Completion of the Brčko final award.
- Fiscal sustainability.
- Entrenchment of the rule of law.
- Signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (a first step in ascension to the EU).
- A positive assessment of the situation in Bosnia by the steering board of the PIC based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement.[162]

These requirements show a focus of the international community (also pointed out in chapter 2) on economic and institutional aspects of peace, so while all these requirements may be fulfilled a negative peace may still be the reality after the completion of these requirements. While the final requirement, the assessment, may also include a judgement on the level of reconciliation in society it is still very vague what situation will qualify for a positive assessment.

4.5 Concluding

Given all of the evidence above, there has been not been a great effort from the international community to really engage with religion and religious actors to the benefit of the peace process.

[162] 'Agenda 5+2', *Office of the High Representative*, p. 2 <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1318> [accessed 29 September 2018].

While the peace accords did provide opportunities for the OHR to incorporate religious actors in the peace process the analysis of the reports of the OHR show that this has not happened frequently. While it may still be possible that there have been religious actors under the broad term of NGOs it is not very likely. Furthermore, the next chapter will focus on the contribution of religious actors to the peace process with or without help from the OHR. It will also give an indication of a realistic potential for religious actors to contribute to the peace process, which in turn will show to what extent the potential of religious peacebuilding has been wasted by the international community.

5. Religious Peacebuilding: What has been done?, What can be done?

As shown in chapter 3, the role of religion in the Bosnian conflict has been a negative one overall, it was a contributor to the rise of hostile ethnoreligious nationalism which was one of the main causes of the conflict. Additionally, in chapter 4 is was shown that the OHR has had a very limited engagement with religion and religious actors. However, this does not mean that religious actors have not contributed to the peacebuilding process, some did so even already during the war. In this chapter I will give an overview of the peacebuilding activities that have been undertaken by religious actors. However, straight to the point, in a study regarding religious peacebuilding in the Balkans, Sterland and Beauclerck note that, 'a major finding of the study is, that there are remarkably few faith-based or faith-led peace building initiatives being carried out in the Balkans.'[163] Furthermore, Clarck in a similar study, but focused on Bosnia specifically, found that 'religious actors are doing little to facilitate reconciliation and in some cases are actually obstructing the process.'[164]

5.1 Popular Attitudes Towards Religion and Reconciliation

First of all, it is important to note that Bosnia is a relatively religious society. In a survey carried out by Wilkes et al., which is claimed as 'the most solid research base to date for understanding public feelings about reconciliation in Bosnia'[165] 72% of the respondents declared that they are religious.[166] The survey further shows that there is a strong support for reconciliation and trust-building, especially amongst the more religious citizens. 75.4% of the respondents indicated that 'a serious attempt to build relationships amongst religious and ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have an impact on the future of the country'[167] This result was strengthened by the fact that further results showed a strong support for the spending of public money on educational activities which foster understanding, appreciation of diversity and reconciliation. And while most of the respondents indicated that economic development was the greatest priority for the country, Wilkes et al. state that the results of the research do not support 'the view that economic progress will by itself do away with the need for a deliberate focus on reconciliation.'[168]

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[163] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 3.
[164] Clarck, p. 672.
[165] George R. Wilkes and others, *Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust. Results From a Survey Conducted in 13 Cities Across Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2013.* (The University of Edinburgh/Project on Religion Ethics in the Making of War and Peace, Center for Empirical Research on Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013), p. 5.
[166] Wilkes and others, p. 10.
[167] Wilkes and others, p. 5.
[168] Wilkes and others, pp. 6–7.

Regarding the possibility of achieving reconciliation, in another survey-based research (which focused on reconciliation amongst other concepts) by Valiñas et al., 40% of the respondents indicated that it was possible for Bosnians to reconcile, while 29% thought the opposite. Subsequently 31% answered they did not know, this considerable number provides opportunities and potential for (religious) peacebuilding. Good examples and practise at the political level, but also on the social level, could swing these people to a more optimistic view.[169] Additionally, the research found that out of three types of harm, material, physical, and emotional, emotional harm was the most widespread. 86% had indicated that they had suffered either much or very much emotional harm. However, this type has not been targeted as much by larger organisations and institutions.[170] As Lederach notes, the nature of contemporary conflict make the, emotive, social-psychological, and spiritual dimensions core, not peripheral, concerns.'[171] And it is through reconciliation that these dimensions can be properly addressed.[172]

The survey by Wilkes et al. further pointed out that, regarding possible participants in the reconciliation process, importance was added to the inclusion of a broad range of participants. And 54.3% of the sample thought it important that religious leaders participate in a reconciliation process.[173] Additionally, approximately 56% thought it important, or very important for lay believers who are active in society to be part of a reconciliation process. Finally, 62% rated the potential contribution of religious believers with a sincere and personal faith to a trust-building initiative as either, important, or very important.[174] As the result of these surveys show, large parts of the population definitely consider a reconciliation process valuable. The inclusion of religious actors in this process is also valued albeit less enthusiastic. But all things considered, the results show that there is a need for religious elements in a reconciliation process. Observing that there definitely are opportunities for religious peacebuilding efforts, I will first show what obstructs religious actors in effectively contributing to this process.

5.2 Challenges for Religious Peacebuilding

What hampers effective religious peacebuilding is, first and foremost, the link between religion and politics which is still very strong. While this is also a result of the fusing of the national identity with the religious one (as analysed in chapter 3), there are a number of different reasons why this links still remains so strong. The main obstacles will be examined in this section.

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[169] Marta Valiñas, Stephan Parmentier, and Elmar Weitekamp, *'Restoring Justice' in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Report of a Population-Based Survey* (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2009), pp. 45–46.
[170] Valiñas, Parmentier, and Weitekamp, pp. 21–22.
[171] Lederach, p. 29.
[172] Lederach, pp. 29–35.
[173] Wilkes and others, p. 6.
[174] Wilkes and others, pp. 19, 24.

5.2.1 Link Between Religion and Politics

Firstly, as mentioned before, the political power-sharing system in Bosnia plays into hands of ethno-national politicians. Religious leaders who are in the first place looking out for their communities still align themselves with these nationalistic figures in order to secure the political interest of their of their communities. However, nationalistic politicians who are aware that religious leaders enjoy more trust and credibility than politicians sometimes manipulate, or even worse, bribe the religious leaders into support.[175] This particular problem is also related to the issue of restitution of expropriated and nationalized territory. Merdjanova and Brodeur explain that, property restitution is vital for the survival of religious communities, and that in Bosnia it has been turned into a political tool, because it has been left largely to the discretion of municipal officials and is done on an ad hoc basis, making religious leaders dependent on politicians.[176] This strong link between religion and politics is also evidenced in the 31st report of the OHR, in which it is stated that the HDZ 1990, a Croatian nationalistic party had won considerably during the elections partly because it enjoyed the perception that the Catholic Church supported it.[177] Additional evidence is provided by the fact that, the leaders of the Islamic community and Catholic Church have openly supported nationalistic parties during the elections.[178]

5.2.2 Different Views on Responsibility and History

Next to the still strong link between politics and religion, the vastly different views on history and the responsibility for the war also obstructs religious peacebuilding efforts. Once again this is also an inheritance of the fusion of the nationalistic identity and the religious one. Religious history and national history have partially, or wholly, become the same. And just like politicians, religious actors have repeatedly denied responsibility for their role the war and refused to accept the crimes committed by their own side.[179] Subsequently, the majority of those who blame religious leaders for their involvement in the war do not see them as valuable advocates for peace, and in the survey by Valiñas et al., 24% of the respondents attributed accountability for the war to religious leaders.[180] These vastly different views are well exemplified by the support some of the detainees of the ICTY

[175] Fazlić, pp. 335–38; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 12; Zilka Spahić-Šiljak, 'Believers for Social Change: Bridging the Secular Religious Divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *International Relations and Diplomacy*, 3.10 (2015), 681–90 (p. 683).
[176] Johnston and Eastvold, p. 231; Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 88.
[177] '31st Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations', *Office of the High Representative*, 2007 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=39119> [accessed 26 August 2018].
[178] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 13.
[179] Fazlić, p. 322; Valiñas, Parmentier, and Weitekamp, p. 32.
[180] Fazlić, p. 322; Clarck, pp. 676–83.

received from some clerics of the SOC.[181] Clarck notes how in 2008, around 300 people attended a televised rally in support of Karadžić and Mladić which ended with a service in an Orthodox Church with one church official wearing a shirt over his religious clothing with the faces of Mladić and Karadžić and the text, *Srpski heroji* (Serbian heroes). Giving such open support to people who are held responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica only reinforces the negative image the others (especially the Bosniaks) have of the SOC.[182]

These vastly different views on the responsibility for the war have also resulted in very different views on achieving reconciliation and a peaceful society. For her article *Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,* Wettach asked religious leaders from the different religions their views on how to achieve truth, justice, and coexistence (necessary conditions for reconciliation as shown in chapter 2) in Bosnia. The answers show great differences religious leaders hold regarding the way in which these concepts should be achieved. The interpretation of the term coexistence for example, shows in addition to differences, that religious leaders focus on more worldly concerns and less on spiritual and relational, only the Franciscans focus on the need for social justice and reconciliation. Where the Catholic Church would like to see the canton model (i.e. more local autonomy) implemented across the country, creating more equality since the Croats do not have their own entity. The Muslims would like to see the entities abolished completely since the RS was established, in their eyes, through a war of aggression.

Regarding coexistence, the SOC would like to keep the entities in place, or have a unified state.[183] Regarding justice, the Muslims are supportive of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and focus more on retributive justice. The Christian traditions also address the necessity of forgiving guilt and name equality for ethnicities in the areas of, property restitution, religious education and employment as conditions for justice. The term truth is for most leader related to culpability for the war. Where the Catholic and Muslim agree that it was a war of Serbian aggression, the SOC blame the Bosniaks (for wanting to partition from Yugoslavia) or the international community for the early recognition of breakaway states from Yugoslavia.[184] The table below is taken from Wettach's article and gives a good overview of the differences between religious

[181] Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 83; Spahić-Šiljak, 'Believers for Social Change: Bridging the Secular Religious Divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 683.
[182] Clarck, p. 686.
[183] Wettach, p. 14.
[184] Wettach, p. 13.

leaders.

Interpretation of the main terms	Jews	Catholics	Franciscans	Muslims	Serbian Orthodoxy
Truth	Honesty, trust, clarification of war crimes	Culpability Aggression Serbians	Clarification of war crimes	Culpability Aggression Serbians	Culpability Muslims, International community, Germany
Justice	Punishment of war criminals equality + equal opportunity	Equality + equal opportunity Forgiving guilt	Equality of all constitutive peoples of BiH Forgiveness, Punishment of war criminals	Punishment of war criminals Acceptance of the ICTY	Neutrality Critique of ICTY Forgiving guilt Equality + equal opportunity
Coexistence	Dismantling entities/central state	Dismantling entities/canton model	Social justice Reconciliation	Dismantling entities/central state	Status quo /Dismantling entities/canton mode

Tabel 1: Summary of interview results[185]

5.2.3 Lack of Tradition

As discussed in chapter 2, interreligious dialogue can be a valuable and important peacebuilding tool. In Bosnia however, due to a lack of tradition (with the exception of the Catholic Order of the Franciscans in northern Bosnia) in this area, as noted by several commentators, the potential for this activity is severely impaired. This lack of tradition is an inheritance of the earlier discussed *millet* system in which religious communities were separated, and the communist period in which religious activity was supressed.[186]

Besides that, the lack of grassroots activism is also pointed out. Most of those who organized any sort of peacebuilding activity did so for the first time. Consequence of this was that, international (faith-based) NGOs did not have any local counterparts at the beginning of their work.[187] However, it is also noted that international NGOs (especially in the beginning) lacked sensitivity towards the local context and employed top-down decision making while local skilful staff was undervalued.[188] Furthermore, there is lack in strategy and coordination between different NGOs, faith-based as well as secular, and local as well as international.[189] Moreover, Sterland and Beauclerk note the lack of an

[185] Reprinted from: Wettach, p. 14.
[186] Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 115; Brajovic, pp. 194–95; Fazlić, p. 323; Oršolić, pp. 40–41; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 17.
[187] Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 114; Peuraca, pp. 4–6.
[188] Merdjanova and Brodeur, pp. 118–19; Peuraca, pp. 4–6.
[189] Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 120; Zilka Spahić-Šiljak, 'Women, Religion and Peace Leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina', 2014, p. 5; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 38.

overview of faith based peace initiatives, and state that the documentation and communication of experience requires more attention.[190]

5.2.4 Religious Education

Another point that challenges religious peacebuilding in Bosnia, is the low level of religious education of religious leaders as well as the population.[191] This is, again a heritage from the communist past in which religion was supressed. It is very important to provide proper religious education, especially in a religiously diverse country such as Bosnia. By providing proper religious education people can learn about each other's culture and traditions so that the negative stereotypes and myths can be done away with. Moreover, the poor education of the religious leaders causes them to, not fully understand their role as leaders (and potential peacebuilders). Furthermore, it also causes them to enjoy less respect and credibility among their communities, which makes them less effective as peacebuilders.[192]

5.2.5 Divisions Within Religions

A final serious challenge to those religious actors who take on active peacebuilding roles is, the fact that they can encounter serious resistance from within their communities and religious institutions.[193] Peuraca states that, 'By participating in in interfaith dialogue, clerics may be risking their reputation, credibility, and trust within their own community. Early in the reconciliation process, some were even risking their personal safety.'[194] This also emphasises the importance of providing proper religious education, so that peacemakers who are seeking dialogue with the religious other can be better understood by their communities and enjoy more support instead of opposition.

Regarding the institutions, it is noted that within the different faiths there exists internal divisions of moderate and conservative voices within the official hierarchies which provide an obstacle for local peacebuilders. Merdjanova and Brodeur note that, on different occasions religious leaders have openly attacked lower ranking clergy in order to control interreligious peacebuilding. Furthermore, they cite an interviewee who indicates that the contact with religious communities is one of the main difficulties regarding interreligious action and that none of the three religions is open

[190] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 39; Fazlić, p. 334.
[191] Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 11, 33; Spahić-Šiljak, 'Women, Religion and Peace Leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 3; Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 112.
[192] Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 11, 33; Clarck, p. 683.
[193] Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 115; Peuraca, pp. 3, 8; Clarck, pp. 683–84, 688–90; Fazlić, pp. 333–34; Spahić-Šiljak, 'Believers for Social Change: Bridging the Secular Religious Divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 683; Spahić-Šiljak, 'Women, Religion and Peace Leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 3; Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 23–34.
[194] Peuraca, p. 8.

for activities that are taking place outside their supervision.[195]

In the Islam this division is a result of the influence of Wahhabism, a fundamentalist strain within the Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Islam. In Bosnia, Wahhabism was introduced when the foreign mujahedeen arrived to aid the Bosniak side in the war. Wahhabis view moderate imams as corrupted because they don't teach the 'true' Islam. When these Wahhabi voices try to silence the moderate ones this creates problems for the peacebuilding process.[196] Additionally, within the SOC more liberal and open-minded leaders are often vilified by hard-line bishops.[197] Moreover, there is the example of the Catholic Church that had withdrawn its early support to one of the best-known religious peace initiatives in Bosnia, the interreligious Pontanima choir founded by the Franciscan Ivo Marković, on the ground that it promotes syncretism.[198]

As the above shows, there are a lot of challenges that prevent religious actors to provide a positive contribution to the peace process. However, as the survey results show there are definitely opportunities to do so. And despite all the mentioned challenges there have been a few good examples of religious peacebuilding, these will now be examined in the following section.

5.3 Peacebuilding Efforts by Religious Actors

Although maybe not enough, religious peacebuilding activities have been organized on different levels in Bosnia. Unfortunately, as stated before, in Bosnia there is a lack of overview and documentation of faith based peace initiatives. In this final section however, I will provide an overview of the most prominent and successful peacebuilding initiatives in Bosnia. I will start with an analysis of the Inter Religious Council (IRC) followed by international and local, faith-based NGOs. The section will end with a short note on education.

5.3.1 Inter Religious Council

The most prominent peacebuilding effort involving religious actors is the IRC. At the initiative of the United States Institute of Peace and the World Conference on Religion and Peace, on the 9th of June 1997, the highest leaders of the Islamic, Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, and Jewish, faith communities signed the 'Statement of Shared Moral Values' which also marked the beginning of the IRC.[199] The statement and creation of the IRC are regarded as important (symbolic) events, some even claim it as the most important interreligious event in recent Balkan history.[200] The IRC has since then undertaken a range of different activities. They have made a number of declarations calling for peace

[195] Merdjanova and Brodeur, pp. 114–15.
[196] Clarck, pp. 683–84.
[197] Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 30–31.
[198] Clarck, p. 689; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 28.
[199] Clarck, p. 677; Brajovic, pp. 198–200.
[200] Brajovic, p. 199; Clarck, p. 677.

and unity, which have been considered brave and important.[201] The IRC has also drafted two laws, one on the freedom of religion and one concerning the legal status of faith communities in Bosnia, the latter one was adopted by the Bosnian parliament in 2004.[202] Furthermore, the IRC has produced a 'Glossary of Basic Religious Concepts' and has organized dozens of seminars for children, youth women, clergy, religious educators, and young theologians.[203]

The IRC is however not without its flaws and criticism. Sterland and Beauclerck note how two conflicts within the council caused it to effectively to stop working. They further observed that grassroots peace activists often dismiss the council as an expensive irrelevance. And additionally, how Jacob Finci, the Jewish council member, while acknowledging the importance of their potential role to build trust between the communities, had said that the council members had come to an agreement to avoid sensitive topics which could cause division such as, forgiveness, responsibilities of the faith communities, and the role of religion in politics (i.e. topics related to reconciliation). Instead the IRC had decided to focus on such topics like, legal issues regarding freedom of religion, and the restitution of religious property. This example provides evidence that, as discussed in chapter 1, top-level leaders are often locked into their positions, limiting their effectiveness as peacebuilders.[204]

Moreover, Fazlić notes how the activities of the leaders should be better communicated since many activities are confined to a narrow circle of officials and activists and how, 'Priests and imams and their respective communities would feel more comfortable in engaging in interfaith work if adequate information on interfaith activities of their own leaders were regularly transmitted to them through official channels.'[205] However, he also stated that, recently the IRC has increased their efforts in meaningful interfaith work, focussing on two areas, working with young people, and spreading their projects throughout the country. Realizing that by engaging with young people in different areas of the country, more sustainable interfaith work can be achieved.[206]

5.3.2 International NGOs

In Bosnia, hundreds of different international (faith-based) NGOs have been active to aid the peace process and bring about reconciliation. However, many of these NGOs have focused on humanitarian and relief aid, not on the improvement of human relations, as Peuraca sums it up 'The attention to material infrastructure was important; the inattention to human factors was problematic.'[207] And as,

[201] Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 18–19.
[202] Clarck, p. 677.
[203] Fazlić, p. 327; Clarck, p. 677; Merdjanova and Brodeur, pp. 65–67.
[204] Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 19–20.
[205] Fazlić, p. 334.
[206] Fazlić, p. 328.
[207] Peuraca, p. 6.

Fazlić states 'The seminars and workshops organized by these NGOs focused on preparing grant proposals and establishing local organizations rather than on conflict resolution and reconciliation.' While the involvement of international faith-based NGOs in humanitarian aid is also very valuable they are possibilities to be even more effective when also focusing on reconciliation. Peuraca mentions that, while Orthodox and Islamic NGOs lack the experience in operating in the formal frameworks Western NGOs are accustomed to, they do have an immense credibility among communities of their own faith and have a strong negotiating position with the local religious leaders.[208] This example shows some of the advantages particular to religious peacebuilders, they can for example, use their credibility to convince people within their communities of the benefits of reconciliation.

And while many international NGOs may have failed to take the complex Bosnian context properly into account when providing assistance, there are a few notable exceptions. The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and the Quaker Peace and Social Witness are NGOs which really took the local context into account, and provided a long term strategy and commitment which gained them trust and credibility of the local population. Furthermore, they focused on empowerment and social change, which is less visible but still very sustainable and widespread since as Peuraca states, 'More often than not, a person who was making a real change in his or her community had some connection to these faith-based peace workers.'[209] The MCC, for example has been a long-time supporter of the aforementioned Marković and his organization *Oči u Oči* (Face to Face).[210]

5.3.3 Local NGOs

This brings us to the local faith-based NGOs which are active in Bosnia. While there are a number of different local NGOs involved in different peacebuilding activities, a few examples are:

- *Merhamet*, an Islamic humanitarian organization which assists those in need, especially the homeless.
- *La Benevolencia*, a multireligious humanitarian organization which provides assistance to citizens regardless of religious affiliation.
- *Dobrotvor*, a small Serbian humanitarian organization who works with the small Orthodox community in Sarajevo.[211]

While local NGOs are also more focused on humanitarian aid, there are two examples of local NGOs that really stand out and which focus on social change and reconciliation. These are *Oči u Oči*

[208] Peuraca, p. 7.
[209] Peuraca, p. 7.
[210] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 37.
[211] Peuraca, pp. 7–8; Brajovic, p. 197.

founded in 1996 by the Franciscan Ivo Marković and the International Multireligious Intercultural Center (IMIC) founded in 1991 by another Franciscan, Marko Oršolić.[212] It is no mere coincidence that both these examples were initiated by Franciscans. The Franciscan Order has traditionally, a more independent position within the Catholic Church and are thus less constrained by the Church's hierarchy. Moreover, the Franciscans in (northern) Bosnia are exceptional regarding the fact that they do have a tradition of promoting interfaith dialogue.[213] Both organizations are interreligious and focus on creating tolerance and facilitating reconciliation through dialogue, prayer, and joint action in the community.[214] Both Franciscans have also criticized the religious leaders in Bosnia (including Catholic ones) for supporting nationalism.[215]

IMIC, in addition to its activities at the grassroots, like joint prayers and interreligious dialogue workshops, also contributes on an academic level. It runs a Master's Program in Religious Studies and organizes a range of projects and symposia, one of which has resulted in a publication also utilized for this research, *Women Religion and Politics* by Spahić-Šiljak.[216] Next to similar grassroots activities as the one IMIC provides, *Oči u Oči* has created the interreligious Pontanima choir which has gained fame throughout the region and beyond. The choir has members of all different religions and sings songs from all religious traditions, bringing together the different religious traditions in a positive manner. It is unfortunate that both IMIC and Oči u Oči do not receive much support from, and are sometimes criticized by official church channels.[217] Organizations like these are often supported and funded by international donors, who in the last decade are increasingly recognizing faith communities as partners and civil society partners.[218] This reflects the statements made in the introduction and chapter 2, that the advantages of religious peacebuilding are getting more recognized.

Next to their successful peace initiatives, Oršolić is noted for his ability to create (informal) networks in the region. As Spahić-Šiljak states, 'Marko was an artist of ties, connecting inconceivably different societal and religious groups and individuals from different fields,: from journalists, filmmakers, artists and writers to clergy persons, civil servant, human rights activists, and business persons.'[219] This example of course evidences the theory that level 2 religious leaders are well positioned to fulfil peacemaking roles as discussed in chapter 2.

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[212] Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 27–28.
[213] Clarck, p. 687; Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 27; Oršolić, pp. 40–41; Brajovic, p. 202.
[214] Oršolić, p. 41; Sterland and Beauclerk, pp. 27–28; Fazlić, p. 327.
[215] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 28; Fazlić.
[216] Merdjanova and Brodeur, p. 108; Fazlić, p. 327.
[217] Clarck, p. 690.
[218] Spahić-Šiljak, 'Women, Religion and Peace Leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 1; Spahić-Šiljak, 'Believers for Social Change: Bridging the Secular Religious Divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 683.
[219] Spahić-Šiljak, 'Believers for Social Change: Bridging the Secular Religious Divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 684.

A final noteworthy characteristic of the religious peacebuilding activities in Bosnia is the role played by women. Commentators observed that, women have played an important and often leading role in peacebuilding efforts.[220] As Spahić-Šiljak states ' Women have been and continue to be on the forefront of peacebuilding activities in local communities.'[221] The importance of this observation is enhanced by the fact that in the survey by Wilkes et al., 63% of the sample indicated the involvement of women in a reconciliation process to be, either important or very important.[222]

5.3.4 Education

While there have been initiatives to enhance religious education on different levels, these have not yet proven very successful. For example, the course Culture of Religion, which featured in one of the OHR reports, has not been a successful endeavour. It was offered as an optional course in schools next to the already confessional religious education available. Nevertheless, Sterland and Beauclerk note that 'all religious communities have all expressed their opposition to the scheme.'[223] It is however noted that on the higher (academic) levels of education the situation is better, with the faculties of the different religions providing different forms of (informal) interreligious dialogue. Furthermore, they have worked to remove information that promoted negative images of the religious other.[224]

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there are definitely opportunities for religious actors to improve the peace and reconciliation process in Bosnia. The results of the different surveys show that large parts of the populations are open to, or optimistic about, the involvement of religious actors in the peace process. However, there are a great many challenges which impedes the different religions in effectively contributing to the peace process. While some of these challenges are a historic inheritance from the communist era other are by their own fault. Yet, the examples of Marković and Oršolić evidence why religious actors are very well situated to facilitate reconciliation and should be incorporated in the peace process. However, as long as religious actors and institutions will not distance themselves more from nationalistic politicians and will not lend their official support to such initiatives as IMIC and *Oči u Oči,* religions potential as a peacemaker will unfortunately never be realized.

[220] Spahić-Šiljak, 'Women, Religion and Peace Leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 1; Merdjanova and Brodeur, pp. 100–101.
[221] Spahić-Šiljak, 'Women, Religion and Peace Leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 1.
[222] Wilkes and others, p. 23.
[223] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 32.
[224] Sterland and Beauclerk, p. 31.

6. Conclusion

The main aim of this research was to explore how, and if, the international community and the field of IR in general incorporates religion and, especially, religious peacebuilding into their practice. This was done by means of a case study that examined the Bosnian situation, specifically, the DPA, the policies of the OHR, and religious actors themselves. In this final chapter it is time to answer the main research question presented in the introduction: *What role have religious actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina played in the peace and reconciliation process, and to what extent has their potential (positive or negative) and influence been considered by the Dayton Peace Accords and the policies of the Office of the High Representative?* Furthermore, I will provide a short summary of the research and assess the findings of this research. Additionally, I will also mention some of the limitations I encountered during this research and propose additional venues for further research.

6.1 Summary & Sub-Questions

The answer to the main research question will be derived from the answers provided to the sub-questions as discussed in chapters 3-5. Additionally, in the introduction and the 2nd chapter it was shown that, in Bosnia, the peace process has failed and that the current negative peace needs to be transformed in a positive peace. Furthermore, the 2nd chapter also showed that this transformation can be achieved through the concept of reconciliation. Moreover, evidence was provided why religious actors are well situated to facilitate reconciliation and contribute to the peace process.

However, before analysing a peace process, it is also important to take note of the historical context of the conflict. This was done in chapter 3 and this chapter also provided the answer to the first sub-question:

- *What is the historical context of the conflict?*

In the chapter it was shown that the disintegration of communist Yugoslavia and the economic and political malaise that accompanied it, provided fertile ground for the incitement of ethno-religious nationalism which, in turn, directly caused the war. Additionally, the chapter shows that politicians, intellectuals, and religious actors were all culpable for the fusion of the nationalistic identity with the religious one, and for the escalation of ethnoreligious hostilities. I concluded that religions' own negative contribution to the war would limit their potential as peacebuilders. However, I also concluded that, if religious actors are willing to distance themselves from nationalism and be critical of their own behaviour, they definitely can be of great value to the peace and reconciliation process.

After the history and context of the Bosnian situation had been made clear, chapter 4

provided an analysis of the DPA and the policies of the OHR. Firstly, the DPA were analysed which provided an answer to the following sub-question:

- *Did the DPA (and if so in what ways) take into account the religious actors and their potential to bring about reconciliation and peace.*

The analysis showed that the DPA did not take into account religious actors as peacebuilders and their potential to bring about reconciliation. However, it did provide an opportunity to do so by creating the OHR, this brings us to the next sub-question:

- *What have been the policies of the Office of the High Representative regarding reconciliation and peacebuilding among ethno-religious communities?*

The analysis of 53 reports from the HR to the UN showed that there were no specific policies incorporating religious actors in peacebuilding or reconciliation efforts. Only in six reports was religion mentioned in relation to peacebuilding efforts. And while HR Wolfgang Petritsch did state that his office continues to attach high importance to the role of religion in the reconciliation process among the ethnic communities, this claim is not supported by the other reports. However, it must be added that during Petritsch tenure, the OHR did have more consideration for the potential of religious actors to aid in the peace process. 5 out of the 6 reports which mentioned religion in relation to peacebuilding where from the period that Petritsch was the active HR. However, as stated above, there were few instances when religious actors were included in peacebuilding efforts. They were included in efforts to improve religious education and were present at a memorial service at the Srebrenica–Potočari cemetery. Additionally, in one of the reports, it is mentioned that the OHR works to revitalize the Inter Religious Council in Bosnia, a fine example of religious peacebuilding.

So while the research has shown that the DPA and policies of the OHR did not provide a substantial engagement with religious actors, religious actors themselves are not just mere passive bystanders. So in the final chapter the efforts (positively or negatively) by religious actors to the peace process were analysed. Furthermore, the positions and attitudes of Bosnia's population towards a reconciliation process (involving religious actors) were analysed. This was done so a realistic potential for religious actors to bring about reconciliation could be determined. This chapter then provided the answer to the last sub-question:

- *What efforts have been made by religious actors and what is their potential to bring about reconciliation and peace amongst the different ethno-religious communities?*

Firstly, the survey based studies by Valiñas et al. and Wilkes et al. revealed that the popular attitude towards a reconciliation process is optimistic. Additionally, the incorporation of religious actors was

also welcomed, but with less support. The chapter also showed that religious peacebuilders in Bosnian face a great deal of challenges. For example, the close link between religious actors and nationalistic politicians greatly affects religious actors' potential as peacebuilders. This potential is further challenged by divisions within religions, as well as the vastly different views regarding culpability for the war, and the lack of an interreligious tradition within Bosnia. The chapter further showed that while efforts definitely have been made by religious actors, in totality it has been too little. Furthermore, has not been much focus on reconciliation, with most efforts being directed at (helpful and also necessary) humanitarian aid. There were 2 great examples of local NGOs (*Oči u Oči* & IMIC) founded by two Franciscans that focused on reconciliation and which really evidenced why religious actors are well positioned to facilitate reconciliation and peacebuilding.

6.2 Main Research Question and Discussion

Now the answers to the sub-questions have been provided it is time to move on to the answering of the main research question:

What role have religious actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina played in the peace and reconciliation process, and to what extent has their potential (positive or negative) and influence been taken into account by the Dayton Peace Accords and the policies of the Office of the High Representative?

To answer the first part of this twofold question, a small and overall negative role. Explanations for the fact that there have not been many religious peacebuilding efforts were provided in chapter 5. It was shown that religious peacebuilders face a great deal of challenges in Bosnia. First and foremost, the close link that exists between religion and politics in Bosnia seriously hampers the potential of religious actors' ability to facilitate reconciliation. Moreover, vastly different views on Bosnia's history and in particular the conflict further complicate matters, while divisions within religions between conservative and more liberal voices also limits religious actors' ability as a peacemaker. However, considering the attitude of the population, and the two positive examples mentioned above, there are definitely opportunities to expand and strengthen the role of religious actors in the reconciliation process in Bosnia. However, it must be noted that, religious leaders in Bosnia, must distance themselves more from nationalistic politicians and be more critical of their own actions. Additionally, they have to be more critical of the wartime actions of the members of their affiliated ethnicity in order to maximize their potential. Furthermore, they need to be more supportive of (interreligious) peacebuilding activities like the two NGOs mentioned above. Finally, more cooperation between the three religious institutions to improve religious education and to make it more inclusive could really improve relations among the ethno-religious communities especially for future generations.

Now that it has been shown that there definitely is a potential for religious actors to contribute more, and more positively, to the peace and reconciliation process it is time to answer the second part of the main research question. The answer to this second part is, to be concise, to very little extent. While the DPA did provide ample opportunity to do so by creating the OHR, the OHR itself did not take religious actors' potential as a peacemaker into account much. As stated above, there were only 6 out of 53 reports that showed the OHR was incorporating or engaging with religious actors in the peace process. The fact that the merits of religious peacebuilding are increasingly being acknowledged did not seem to matter since the latest example out of the 6 dates back to 2002. This is outcome is unfortunate, considering the abovementioned evidence that, there definitely is an unused potential for religious actors to improve the peace process in Bosnia.

Furthermore, there are definitely opportunities for the OHR to better facilitate religious peacebuilding as well. Firstly, the OHR could provide logistical and financial support to initiatives like *Oči u Oči* and IMIC. Considering the fact that religious institutions are still closely linked to politicians the OHR should focus its support on relative independent initiatives/actors similar to the NGOs mentioned above. These actors rely more on their (informal) networks and spiritual capital and are therefore not necessarily dependent on decisions and attitudes within the official religious hierarchies, which gives them more freedom to act. However, this also means that they may not always enjoy support from the official religious structures which makes support from institutions like the OHR all the more valuable.

Additionally, in chapter 5 it was observed that religious peacebuilding is complicated by the fact that, there is a lack of strategy and coordination between different NGOs (of all kinds). Moreover, the lack of an overview of faith based peace initiatives was also noted. The OHR could certainly help to improve these situations by aiding in coordination and documentation of the religious peacebuilding initiatives. This could then provide better insight in which areas the peace process is lacking and in which areas the peace process is successful. Additionally, this information could be collected in a database so that future (religious) peacebuilders have a better insight in which activities are effective in the Bosnian context and which are not.

6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for further Research

Now all the questions this research has posed have been answered and discussed it is time to reflect on the research and provide some suggestions that may expand and deepen the understanding of some of the answers this research has provided.

The greatest limitation encountered during the research was the abovementioned lack of documentation regarding the religious peacebuilding efforts. While I was hoping to base the final chapter mostly on original sources I, unfortunately, had to base it on secondary literature. Besides,

the language barrier further exacerbated this problem. Where most organizations within Bosnia did not even have websites, the ones that did only offered it in their local language.

Considering the outcomes of this research, further research may focus more in depth on the reasons why the OHR generally neglected to incorporate religion into the peace process. Due to the nature of the method used during this research I was not able to show the exact reasons why this has not happened. For example, interviews with the different HRs could also show why Petritsch incorporated religion more in the peace process and why this practice did not continue under the different HRs. Further research focused on similar institutions and their engagement with religious actors could reveal if the OHR is a relative exception in their limited engagement, or that this is still the norm and that religious actors' positive potential is still largely ignored in the field of IR.

Finally, is was shown that international donors in Bosnia, have increasingly been noticing and acknowledging the potential of religious peacebuilding while the OHR unfortunately has not. Considering this, additional research could also focus on the reasons why donors from the international community are taking religious peacebuilding potential into account, whereas the diplomats are still neglecting this, unfortunately.

Attachment: 1. OHR Report Index

Report no.	Period covered by report.	Mentioning of religion regarding peacebuilding	Mentioning of religion in general	No mention of religion	Active High Representative
1	12/1995 – 3/1996			x	Carl Bildt (Sweden)
2	3/1996 – 7/1996			x	"
3	7/1996 – 9/1996			x	"
4	9/1996 – 12/1996			x	''
5	12/1996 – 3/1997		Mentioning of the destruction of religious property		"
6	4/1996 – 6/1996		Pilgrims crossing the entity line for the Papal mass.		"
7	7/1997 – 9/1997		Attacks on religious objects. (a church and a mosque)		Carlos Westendorp (Spain)
8	10/1997 – 12/1997			x	"
9	1/1998 – 3/1998			x	"
10	4/1998 – 6/1998			x	"
11	7/1998 – 9/1998			x	"
12	10/1998 – 12/1998			x	"
13	1/1999 – 3/1999			x	"
14	4/1999 – 6/1999		Noting a human rights case, regarding the building of mosques in the Republika Srpska and the negative effects of unjust reallocation of religious buildings. Mentioning of a priest that went missing during the war. The HR states that tensions, especially between religious communities keep resurfacing.		
15	6/1999 – 10/1999	The organisation of round table conversations regarding education in	Noting that the RS complied with an order from the Human Rights Chamber to provide information on the disappearance of a priest at the end of the war. Furthermore, the RS also failed to honor another ruling of the Human		Carlos Westendorp/

		which representatives of religious bodies were invited.	Rights Chamber which affirms the rights of the Islamic community to (re)build mosques.		Wolfgang Petritsch (Austria)
16	10/1999 – 4/2000		Repeating the previous mentioned statement that the RS is not complying with the rights of the Islamic community to (re)build mosques. Repeating the shortcomings of the RS regarding the provision of information on the missing priest and his family. Stating that two companies refuse to provide compensation for workers who were dismissed during the war due to their ethnicity or religion.		Wolfgang Petritsch
17	4/2000 – 10/2000	The HR discussed restitution programmes with religious leaders, local authorities and international organizations.	Noting that the RS is still not complying with the rights of Islamic communities to (re)construct mosques and the HR has intervened to ensure full compliance.		"
18	10/2000 – 2/2001		Noting that a permit to rebuild a mosque has been granted after intervention by the HR.		"
19	2/2001 – 6/2001	The school subject "Culture of Religions" gets introduced in September 2002.	Taking note of Serb nationalist violence at the start of the rebuilding of mosques in RS. Under pressure of the HR, RS authorities apologized for the violence and a multi-ethnic Reform and Reconciliation Committee was established.		
20	6/2001 – 8/2001	HR states that his office continues to attach high importance to the role of religion in the process of reconciliation among the ethnic communities of BiH. His office looks to revitalizing the Inter-Religious council which gathers the leaders of the main faiths.	The white mosque in Brčko is being reconstructed without any incidents so far, a sign of inter-ethnic tolerance according to the HR. Noting that the construction of the mosques, which was disturbed earlier is finally underway. The president of the RS was present at the laying of the first stone.		"
21	8/2001 – 2/2002	The HR notes that the Reconciliation and Reform Committee formed after the violent incidents at the reconstruction sites of mosques in the RS has only met once.			"

		The HR states that his offices continues to facilitate dialogue between the three majority religious groups, focussing especially on the reconstruction of religious monuments as a means of encouraging religious freedom.			
22	2/2002 – 5/2002		The HR mentions that during his tenure it was necessary to face down nationalistic and religious intolerance.		"
23	5/2002 – 10/2002	Regarding to the 7th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre the HR states the following: "A groundbreaking ceremony – a private occasion involving religious officials and members of the Families – took place on 11 October."			Paddy Ashdown (United Kingdom)
24	10/2002 – 8/2003			x	"
25	9/2003 – 12/2003			x	"
26	1/2004 – 6/2004			x	"
27	7/2004 – 12/2004			x	"
28	1/2005 – 6/2005			x	"
29	6/2005 – 1/2006			x	"
30	2/2006 – 6/2006		Mentioning of violence in Mostar in relation to a football match, however the violence took on an inter-ethnic character. The incident was followed by weeks of political deadlock and incitement from political and religious leaders.		Christian Schwarz-Schilling (Germany)
31	7/2006 – 3/2007		The HR states that the HDZ 1990 (a nationalistic Bosnian Croat party) had won quite considerably during the elections. The party had benefitted from the perceptions that is was backed by the Catholic Church. Noting that that two religious buildings in the Brčko district were restored.		"
32	4/2007 – 9/2007			x	Christian Schwarz-Schilling/Miroslav Lajčák (Slovakia)

33	10/2007 – 3/2008		Noting that Bosnian Serbs share the general Serb identification with Kosovo on grounds of faith culture and nationhood. This is mentioned in relation to protests in RS against Kosovo's declaration of independence.		Miroslav Lajčák
34	4/1008 – 10/2008		The HR describes an issue regarding the census. The RS insisted that religious and ethnic affiliation should also be included. This was followed by threats of the RS to hold their own census. Eventually both did not happen. Noting the criticism expressed by Croat and Serb leaders on lenient sentence against the former army commander of the Republic of BiH Rasim Delić for failure to prevent war crimes of the Mujahedeen Brigade.		"
35	11/2008 – 4/2009			x	Miroslav Lajčák/Valentin Inzko (Austria)
36	5/2009 – 10/2009			x	Valentin Inzko
37	11/2009 – 4/2010			x	
38	5/2010 – 10/2010		Former wartime BiH presidency member Ejup Ganić was detained by UK authorities pursuant to an extradition request from Serbia. The London court however rejected the request stating that the motive for prosecution was based on politics, race or religion.		
39	10/2010 – 4/2011			x	
40	4/2011 – 10/2011		Mentioning of a dispute over the reconstruction of a mosque in Livno a town in the Federation. It is also noted that this dispute has the potential to raise the inter-ethnic tension in the town.		"
41	10/2011 – 4/2012		Mentioning of a terrorist act by Serbian Islamic radical who shot the embassy of the USA in Sarajevo. Noting a defence and security meeting discussing the incident. One of the conclusions was the country needs to address the issue of radical religious indoctrination.		"
42	4/2012 – 10/2012			x	"
43	10/2012 – 4/2013		Noting of a contentious issue where a Serbian Orthodox Church is being constructed in close proximity of an exhumed mass grave and also near the Srebrenica–Potočari memorial center. The RS Ministry of Urbanism granted a permit overturning the decision of the municipality which denied to grant a permit.		"

44	4/2013 – 10/2013		Noting that the first post-war census has been completed. And while the political and public focus has been on issues related to ethnicity, religion and language the real value of the census will relate to its utility for social and economic planning. Noting that the preparations for the Srebrenica commemoration was marked by tensions related to the issue of the construction orthodox church mentioned in the previous report. Mentioning of the sentencing of 6 leaders of the Bosnian Croat wartime community who were convicted of crimes which were the consequence of a plan to remove the Muslim population of territory controlled by the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. Noting the release of Momčilo Krajišnik, a member of the Bosnian Serb wartime leadership who was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for crimes against humanity committed by crimes based on political, racial and religious grounds, deportation and inhumane acts. Upon arrival in the city of Pale in RS he was welcomed by several thousand people as a war hero. Noting that ethnically motivated attacks took place on returnees. For example a Bosniak returnee in the RS was attacked as he walked into the local mosque to celebrate Eid.		"
45	10/2013 – 4/2014			x	"
46	4/2014 – 10/2014		Noting that the Orthodox church near the Srebrenica–Potočari memorial still fuels tensions. The church was completed and consecrated in September 2014.		"
47	10/2014 – 4/2015			x	"
48	4/2015 – 10/2015		Mentioning of a group of Croats who left an open gas canister at the entrance of a mosque in the village Omerovići in a Croat-majority municipality in the Federation. Six people were detained while 2 suspects were still being searched for.		"
49	10/2015 – 4/2016		Noting that one individual was arrested and sentenced for terrorist activities. The individual had collected funds and left BIH with the aim of joining Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL).		"

			In the Brčko district the construction of a mosque caused political blockages from Bosnian Serb-dominated political parties and Bosniak-dominated parties.		
50	4/2016 – 10/2016		Seven more individuals were imprisoned for joining or attempting to join ISIL.		"
51	10/2016 – 4/2017		Stating that the BiH Prosecutor's Office continues to investigate and prosecute individuals who left or were planning to leave BiH to join ISIL. However during the reported period no new individuals who were trying to leave were recorded by authorities.		"
52	4/2017 – 10/2017		Repeating the same statement made in the last report regarding individuals wanting to leave BiH to join ISIL and the Prosecutor's Office continued investigation. It is added that 23 persons so far were found guilty of joining ISIL.		"
53	10/2017 – 4/2018		Repeating that no new individual tried to leave BiH for Syria or Iraq. Additionally, the BiH State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) arrested two individuals from the village of Gornja Maoča in the federation under suspicion of terrorism. Furthermore, it is stated that Gornja Maoča is inhabited largely by Wahhabi Muslims and has been raided before by the SIPA on multiple occasions.		"

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